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RESURRECTING ARBITRARINESS
Kathryn E. Miller†
What allows judges to sentence a child to die in prison?
For years, they did so without constitutional restriction. That
all changed in 2012’s Miller v. Alabama, which banned
mandatory sentences of life without parole for children convicted of homicide crimes. Miller held that this extreme sentence was constitutional only for the worst offenders—the
“permanently incorrigible.” By embracing individualized sentencing, Miller and its progeny portended a sea change in the
way juveniles would be sentenced for serious crimes. But if
Miller opened the door to sentencing reform, the Court’s recent
decision in Jones v. Mississippi appeared to slam it shut.
Rather than restrict the discretion of a judge to throw
away the key in sentencing child defendants, the Court in
Jones increased that discretion. It recast Miller as a purely
procedural decision that only required a barebones “consideration” of a defendant’s “youth and attendant characteristics”
to fulfill its mandate of individualized sentencing. Jones further held that judges need not engage in any formal factfinding before sentencing a child to die in prison, which renders
these sentences nearly unreviewable. This Article argues
that, through these two jurisprudential moves, Jones created
conditions that will maximize arbitrary and racially discriminatory sentencing outcomes nationwide, resembling the unconstitutional death sentences of the mid-twentieth century.
This Article is the first to comprehensively analyze Jones,
contending that the decision represents an embrace of unfettered discretion in the sentencing of children facing life without parole. Given the Supreme Court’s gutting of the Eighth
Amendment, I contend that state solutions are the way forward. I propose that states join the national trend of abandoning life without parole sentences for children. Short of
abolishing the sentence, I offer three procedural interventions.
† Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School. Staff Attorney,
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First, states should enact “genuine narrowing” requirements
that establish criteria designed to limit eligibility for life without parole sentences for children to the theoretical “worst of
the worst.” While inspired by the narrowing requirement in
capital sentencing, “genuine narrowing” relies on meaningful
and concrete criteria that seek to achieve the mandate of
Miller that such sentences be uncommon. Second, states
should require jury sentencing, which ensures that sentences
will be imposed by multiple, and typically more diverse, voices
than what currently occurs with judicial sentencing. Third,
states should go beyond merely telling sentencers to take
youth into account in their sentencing decisions, but should
instead inform them that the characteristics of youth are “mitigating as a matter of law,” and when present, must weigh
against an imposition of life without parole.
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INTRODUCTION
“The crime is why we are here. We’re not here because Mr.
Miller suffered abuse at the hands of his father,” proclaimed
Alabama Circuit Judge Mark Craig on April 27, 2021, as he resentenced Evan Miller to life without parole for a homicide that
Mr. Miller had committed as a fourteen-year-old.1 The sentencing judge reached this conclusion despite the fact that this
very crime was the basis for the Supreme Court’s landmark
ruling in Miller v. Alabama—where Mr. Miller was the titular
defendant, and where the Court invalidated mandatory
sentences of life without parole for children due, in part, to
1
Kent Faulk, Evan Miller, Youngest Person Ever Sentenced to Life Without
Parole in Alabama, Must Remain in Prison, ADVANCE LOCAL (Apr. 27, 2021), https:/
/www.al.com/news/2021/04/evan-miller-youngest-child-ever-sentenced-to-lifewithout-parole-in-alabama-must-remain-in-prison.html [https://perma.cc/
X85G-YK4J].
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their reduced culpability.2 The Miller Court also mandated individualized sentencing, which required sentencers to consider
the characteristics of youth, broadly defined as evidence of a
defendant’s immaturity, vulnerability, and ability to change,
but more explicitly including the “family and home environment that surrounds [a young defendant] . . . from which he
cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.”3 Indeed, the Court seemed to linger on Mr. Miller’s
family environment, observing “if ever a pathological background might have contributed to a 14-year-old’s commission
of a crime, it is here.”4
Importantly, Mr. Miller’s 2021 resentencing to life without
parole occurred just five days after the decision in another
critical Supreme Court case, Jones v. Mississippi, where a
newly constituted Court rejected the argument that sentencers
must find child defendants to be “permanently incorrigible”
before imposing life without parole.5 In so holding, the Court
went further than the question immediately before it, announcing that sentencing judges had no burden to make any factual
findings whatsoever before sentencing a child to life without
parole, provided they agreed to “consider[ ] an offender’s youth
and attendant characteristics.”6 Jones v. Mississippi constituted an embrace of unfettered discretion for the Miller cohort
and signaled to sentencing judges—like Mr. Miller’s—that their
decisions would be effectively unreviewable. By doing so, Jones
paved the way for the reimposition of life without parole on Mr.
Miller and others like him. This Article argues that the danger
of Jones goes beyond the harm suffered by these individuals.
The decision creates conditions that will likely maximize arbitrary and racially discriminatory7 sentencing outcomes nationwide, resembling the unconstitutional death sentences of the
mid-twentieth century.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly compared the fates of
children sentenced to die in prison with those of adults sentenced to die by execution. For decades, the Court recognized
2

567 U.S. 460, 467–69, 478–79 (2012).
Id. at 477.
4
Id. at 478–79.
5
141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2021).
6
Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Miller’s resentencing judge made clear that he
“considered” the mitigating evidence presented by defense counsel. See Faulk,
supra note 1.
7
Throughout this Article, I use “racially discriminatory” sentencing outcomes to refer to those resulting from intentional racial animus, unconscious
racial bias, and structural discrimination.
3

R
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that the Eighth Amendment confers special procedural protections on individuals facing the death penalty. Because these
protections were initially available only to those charged capitally, they inspired the phrase “death is different” as an encapsulation of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.8 Beginning with 2005’s Roper v. Simmons,9 and
solidified in 2012’s Miller v. Alabama,10 the Court recognized
that the Eighth Amendment also provided special consideration for children in the criminal legal system—at least those
facing extreme sentences of death or life without parole—inspiring the parallel phrase “children are different.”
In the death penalty context, these protections arose in
response to Furman v. Georgia,11 wherein the Court found that
the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was arbitrarily applied, with Justice Stewart famously declaring, “These
death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”12 As states
addressed the Court’s concern with newly enacted death penalty statutes, the Court recognized that the constitutional imposition of a death sentence required the incorporation of two
principles often in tension: consistency and individualized sentencing. States could achieve consistency through a “narrowing requirement” which limited the class of individuals eligible
for the death penalty—presumably to the “worst of the
worst.”13 Typically, states fulfilled the narrowing requirement
by requiring jurors to find the existence of a statutorily enumerated aggravating factor in order for a defendant charged
with homicide to be deemed death-eligible.14
The Court recognized that perfect consistency,15 though
addressing the arbitrariness concern, came with costs of its
8
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.”).
9
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
10
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
11
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
12
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
13
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (referencing “our narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to death”).
14
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 165–66 (1976).
15
James S. Liebman has argued that this “perfect consistency” was only
theoretical because jurors could nullify mandatory sentencing laws by acquitting
defendants of capital charges and convicting them of lesser charges to circumvent
a death sentence. James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme
Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007).
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own.16 In striking down mandatory death sentences, the Court
rejected perfect consistency as antithetical to a second necessary principle: individualized sentencing.17 To achieve individualized sentencing, states had to enable the sentencer to
consider mitigating factors along with the aggravating ones.
Ultimately, states had to permit sentencing juries to consider
and give effect to evidence amounting to “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death.”18
Miller v. Alabama solidified the Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence by invalidating mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles charged with homicide crimes.19
Miller held that the Eighth Amendment imposed a substantive
constraint on sentencers, permitting life without parole only for
“the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”20 For such sentences to be constitutional, the Court
found, they must be imposed using individualized sentencing,
which meant that the sentencer must take into account aspects of the particular crime and of the particular defendant
that exemplified the characteristics of youth, and presumably,
of reduced culpability.21 In applying individualized sentencing
to children facing life without parole, Miller rendered them
analogous to capital defendants for Eighth Amendment purposes, raising hopes that additional protections might follow.
But unlike in capital jurisprudence, neither Miller nor its progeny Montgomery v. Louisiana22 ever explicitly adopted the
counterbalancing “narrowing requirement” designed to limit
the class of individuals eligible for this most extreme punishment. This omission left open the possibility that sentencer
discretion in the Miller context would be unfettered.
16
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286–87, 287 n.6 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1976).
17
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
18
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
19
567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (“To start with the first set of cases: Roper and
Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater
prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most severe
punishments.’” (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010))).
20
Id. at 479–80.
21
Id. at 465, 475–77.
22
577 U.S. 190, 209 (2016) (holding that Miller applied retroactively because
it constituted a substantive prohibition of life without parole sentences for “all but
the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility”).
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2021’s Jones v. Mississippi23 presented an opportunity for
the Court to place limits on sentencer discretion by requiring a
finding of the defendant’s “permanent incorrigibility” before the
imposition of a life without parole sentence. In rejecting this
argument, the Court went several steps further than required.
It recast Miller as a purely procedural decision—notwithstanding Montgomery’s contrary holding—that required only that the
sentencer consider “an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics” and held that no “formal factfinding” was necessary
before sentencing a child defendant to die in prison.24
This Article argues, that in so holding, the Jones Court
maximized sentencer discretion to an extent resembling that of
the pre-Furman death penalty era. As a consequence, the individualized sentencing mandate will in all likelihood lead to the
same arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes that have
occurred in the capital context. In a previous article,25 I argued
that, without proper guidance as to what evidence constitutes
mitigation, modern capital sentencing juries employing individualized sentencing have run amok, sentencing defendants in
arbitrary and racially discriminatory ways that resemble preFurman outcomes. Not only do Miller sentencers lack this same
guidance, but the Jones decision also ensures that their discretion is effectively limitless. This is particularly worrisome given
that, unlike with capital defendants, judges, not juries, are
typically imposing sentences in Miller cases.26 While the average capital jury may be far from representative due to institutional practices such as death qualification and the racially
biased use of peremptory strikes, it still likely contains at least
one member who has more in common with a criminal defendant than does the average sentencing judge.27
Without efforts to formally curb sentencer discretion, the
results are likely to be harmful. This Article proposes that
states join the national trend of abandoning life without parole
sentences for children. For reluctant states, I present three
interventions. First, states should enact genuine narrowing
23

141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
Id. at 1311.
25
Kathryn E. Miller, The Eighth Amendment Power to Discriminate, 95 WASH.
L. REV. 809, 837–48 (2020) [hereinafter Miller, Power to Discriminate].
26
See, e.g., White v. State, 2021 OK CR 29, ¶ 20, 499 P.3d 762, 769 (finding
the constitution does not require jury resentencing in Miller cases); Martin v.
State, 329 So. 3d 451, 458 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), reh’g denied (Sept. 14, 2021),
cert. denied, 329 So. 3d 1201 (Miss. 2021) (finding statutory right to a jury trial
does not apply to Miller resentencings).
27
See infra Part IV.
24
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requirements that attempt to limit eligibility for life without
parole sentences for children. Second, states should require
jury sentencing for Miller defendants. Third, states should go
beyond merely telling sentencers to take youth into account in
their sentencing decisions but should instead recognize and
inform jurors that the characteristics of youth as delineated in
Miller are mitigating as a matter of law, and when present,
must weigh against an imposition of life without parole. While
support for each of these interventions may be found in the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Jones
decision reveals state legislatures are likely a better avenue for
these reforms, given the Court’s current composition.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I recount the
Supreme Court’s “death is different” jurisprudence and explain
the rise of the twin Eighth Amendment aims of consistency and
individualization in the capital context. In Part II, I explore the
parallel development of the Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence and its abrupt halt in Jones v. Mississippi. In Part
III, I argue that the Jones decision enshrined a version of individualized sentencing that rendered sentencer discretion
nearly limitless and, in doing so, is destined to usher in a new
era of pre-Furman sentencing outcomes in the Miller context.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue for these sentences to be abandoned
before proposing three intermediate interventions—consistent
with the Eighth Amendment—designed to curb sentencer discretion and minimize arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes. I also address possible objections to and limitations of
these interventions.
I
DEATH IS DIFFERENT
In a previous work, The Eighth Amendment Power to Discriminate,28 I recounted the rise of the opposing aims of consistency and individualization in death penalty cases in response
to Furman v. Georgia. In that piece, I focused on the development and evolution of the individualized sentencing requirement.29 In this Part, I briefly revisit that history to provide the
necessary context for the Court’s “death is different” jurisprudence; however, here, I emphasize the consistency aim, manifested in recognition of the “narrowing requirement.”
28
29

Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 817–36.
Id.

R
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A. The Narrowing Requirement
1972’s Furman v. Georgia, the Court’s decision finding the
death penalty unconstitutional, consisted of a 5-4 per curiam
opinion with each Justice writing separately.30 With only
around 600 people on death row in the late 1960s, and less
than five executions in a given year, each of the Justices focused on sentencing outcomes, with some finding death
sentences the result of racial discrimination and others the
result of arbitrariness.31 Justice Brennan emphasized arbitrary outcomes, opining, “When the rate of infliction is at this
low level, it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals
or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for
this punishment.”32 Brennan posited that state sentencing
procedures “actually sanction an arbitrary selection,” and complained that “[n]o one has yet suggested a rational basis that
could differentiate in those terms the few who die from the
many who go to prison.”33 Justice Marshall observed that the
“untrammeled discretion” of juries amounted to an “open invitation” to engage in racial discrimination.34 Justice Douglas
agreed that unfettered discretion led to arbitrary and racist
results, but also noted the death sentences were likely to be
imposed against the powerless generally, including the poor,
racial minorities, the young, the ignorant, and the politically
unpopular.35
While these justices would have found that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se, Justice White and Justice
Stewart separately wrote that the Georgia capital sentencing
scheme was unconstitutional only as applied, emphasizing arbitrary outcomes.36 In declaring Georgia’s death sentences
“wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed,” Justice Stewart likened
receiving a death sentence to being struck by lightning.37 Jus30

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 291–93 (Brennan, J., concurring).
32
Id. at 294.
33
Id. at 294–95.
34
Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring).
35
Id. at 248–57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
36
Id. at 306, 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310–12 (White, J., concurring) (“In joining the Court’s judgments, therefore, I do not at all intimate that
the death penalty is unconstitutional per se or that there is no system of capital
punishment that would comport with the Eighth Amendment. That question,
ably argued by several of my Brethren, is not presented by these cases and need
not be decided.”). The decision also applied to the Texas capital sentencing
scheme challenged in the consolidated case, Branch v. Texas.
37
Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart dismissed as unproven the argument that the death penalty’s application was racially discriminatory, instead of arbitrary: “My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any
31
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tice White blamed the arbitrary outcomes on the death penalty’s infrequent imposition, explaining that even for “the most
atrocious crimes . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not.”38 As the narrowest opinions, Justices
Stewart and White’s reasoning became law, and the holding of
Furman thus came to stand for the proposition that the death
penalty was unconstitutional because it was arbitrarily
applied.39
States responded to Furman with a flurry of legislation
aimed at curing the Court’s arbitrariness concerns, with thirtyfive states and the federal government enacting new capital
sentencing schemes in the years immediately following the decision.40 The new sentencing schemes primarily followed two
models.41 One model, enacted by states like Georgia and Florida, sought to limit discretion by imposing eligibility requirements and enumerating statutory aggravating and mitigating
factors, designed to help sentencers identify the “death worthy.”42 In finding these sentencing schemes constitutional, the
Court emphasized that these procedural mechanisms adequately addressed the “basic concern of Furman centered on
those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily.”43 These mechanisms provided the babasis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the
constitutionally impermissible basis of race. But racial discrimination has not
been proved, and I put it to one side.” Id. at 310 (internal citation and footnote
omitted).
38
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
39
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (“Since five Justices
wrote separately in support of the judgments in Furman, the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds—Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice
White.”). James Liebman has argued that these two opinions are inconsistent,
with Justice White urging a more frequent imposition of death sentences, and
Justice Stewart advocating for standards that limited its application to those most
worthy of death. Liebman, supra note 15, at 6. Liebman further argues that the
Court’s subsequent jurisprudence can best be understood as a toggle between
these positions. Id. at 11–12.
40
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–80 nn.23–24.
41
The Texas capital sentencing scheme charted a third path. Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 268–69 (1976). It contained no reference to aggravating or mitigating circumstances, but also did not make death sentences mandatory. Id. Instead, it sought to achieve consistency both by limiting the crimes eligible for
capital punishment to five specific types of murder and by requiring jurors to
determine the deliberate nature of the crime, the likelihood the defendant would
be dangerous in the future, and the existence of provocation by the victim. Id.
42
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164, 196–97; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250
(1976).
43
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.

R
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sis for the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing requirement, along
with its requirements of proportionality and mandatory appellate review.44
The second model, followed by North Carolina and Louisiana, sought to achieve perfect consistency by making the death
penalty mandatory for certain crimes.45 In striking down these
capital sentencing schemes, the Court explained that the process offended human dignity because it sentenced capital defendants “not as uniquely individual human beings, but as
members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass”:
[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death.46

The invalidation of mandatory sentencing schemes birthed the
Eighth Amendment’s second requirement for capital cases: individualized sentencing.47
Only state capital sentencing statutes with mechanisms
designed to ensure the twin values of consistency and individualized sentencing comported with the Eighth Amendment.
Subsequent cases fleshed out the possible procedural manifestations of these values. The Court first refined the individualized sentencing requirement to prohibit any mechanism—
whether it be a statute or jury instruction—that precluded the
sentencing jury from considering “as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”48 It later clarified that the
44
See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006) (“Together, our decisions in Furman v. Georgia, and Gregg v. Georgia, establish that a state capital
sentencing system must: (1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, personal characteristics,
and the circumstances of his crime.” (internal citations omitted)). But see Pulley
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984) (holding that comparative proportionality review
was “an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing” but was
not constitutionally required).
45
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286, 287 n.6 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1976).
46
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted).
47
Marsh, 548 U.S. at 173–74.
48
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (invalidating a death penalty
statute that limited sentencer consideration to specifically enumerated mitigators); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105, 109 (1982) (invalidating death
sentence where the judge believed he could not consider certain mitigating evi-
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sentencer’s consideration must be meaningful; capital jurors
must be instructed in such a way that allows them to “give
effect to” the defendant’s mitigation evidence.49
In defining what it called the “narrowing requirement,” the
Court explained that to be constitutional, capital sentencing
statutes must “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder.”50 The purpose of this narrowing requirement was to identify the most culpable offenders for
whom the penological justifications for death—including incapacitation and retribution—are greatest. The Court focused its
analysis on state legislation that narrowed eligibility for death
based on attributes of the offense. For example, a state could
not decree all murders death-eligible; instead, it had to articulate statutory factors that distinguished those that were eligible
for a death sentence from those that were ineligible.51 These
statutory factors became known alternately as aggravating factors, or eligibility factors.52 The Court held that states could
satisfy the narrowing requirement in one of two ways.53 First,
states could simply narrow the definition of capital murder to
exclude certain types of murder.54 In this instance, a jury performed the narrowing function by finding the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the elements of murder that
rendered the crime capital.55 Alternatively, states could
broadly define capital murder but then require the sentencing
dence in sentencing decision); Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 328
(1989) (holding that Texas special issues—“yes or no” questions a Texas jury must
answer in every capital sentencing that determine whether a defendant will be
sentenced to death—did not allow jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence of
mental retardation); Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 800 (2001) (holding that a supplemental mitigation instruction did not allow jurors to give effect to
mitigating evidence of mental retardation); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S.
233, 264–65 (2007) (finding that the Texas special issues precluded meaningful
consideration of mitigating evidence); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289
(2007) (same).
49
Penry I, 492 U.S. at 328; Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 362; Brewer, 550 U.S. at
293–94.
50
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
51
Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216 (2006). To date, the Court has failed
to uphold the constitutionality of a death sentence resulting from a non-homicide
crime. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (finding the death penalty
unconstitutional as a punishment for the rape of an adult woman); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (finding the death penalty unconstitutional
for the rape of a child).
52
Brown, 546 U.S. at 216 n.2.
53
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 245–46.
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jury to find the existence of certain statutory aggravating factors to render a particular defendant death-eligible.56
The Court made clear that “standards so vague that they
would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries” did not satisfy the narrowing requirement because “a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like
that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.”57 In Godfrey v. Georgia, the Court struck down an aggravating factor
that failed to genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible
murders because the factor was vague enough to apply to most
murders.58 The Georgia capital sentencing scheme permitted
jurors to impose death after finding that the murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.”59 This factor failed the narrowing requirement because such a
description could apply to “almost every murder,” and thus its
existence provided no restraint on the arbitrary imposition of
death.60 The Court concluded, “There is no principled way to
distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed,
from the many cases in which it was not.”61 Several years later,
in Maynard v. Cartwright, the Court similarly invalidated the
aggravating factor “that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel” because its vagueness allowed jurors openended discretion.62 The factor thus violated the narrowing requirement because it gave jurors “no more guidance than the
‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman’
language.”63
The takeaways from the Court’s narrowing jurisprudence
have been summed up best by Professors Steven Shatz and
Nina Rivkind, who have noted that the Furman mandate has
56

Id. at 246.
446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (internal quotation omitted).
58
Id. at 428–29.
59
Id. at 428.
60
Id. at 428–29.
61
Id. at 433.
62
486 U.S. 356, 361–64 (1988).
63
Id. at 364. The Court allowed for the possibility that the aggravator could
be constitutional if the terms were defined to require torture or serious physical
abuse. Id. at 365. But see Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 453, 459 (2005) (upholding
death sentence despite resting on “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator because the Tennessee Supreme Court had employed a “narrowing construction” to limit the application of the aggravator); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 653–54 (1990) (upholding death sentence resting on “especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved” aggravator where sentencing judge was presumed to have
applied narrowing construction determined by the Arizona Supreme Court), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Lewis v. Jeffers,
497 U.S. 764, 783–84 (1990) (finding Arizona’s “especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved” aggravator constitutional as applied to the petitioner’s case).
57
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both a quantitative and a qualitative component: “(1) the
death-eligible class of convicted murderers must be small
enough that a substantial percentage are in fact sentenced to
death; and (2) the states, through their legislatures, must decide the composition of the death-eligible class.”64 Only when
both prongs have been satisfied has “genuine narrowing”
occurred.65
A second form of narrowing has restricted death-eligibility
based on offender attributes. Unlike traditional narrowing,
where the Court imposed the basic requirement but left the
details to the states to determine, narrowing based on offender
attributes has been substantively defined via the Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality doctrine.66
In these cases, the Court has created categorical constitutional
exclusions from capital punishment for groups deemed less
culpable by finding that the punishment of these groups violated the evolving standards of decency. These have included
children, those suffering from insanity, and those with an intellectual disability.67 The Court has occasionally engaged in this
“judicial narrowing” with respect to offense attributes as well,
holding that death was not a constitutional punishment for
crimes of rape that did not accompany a homicide.68 Typically,
following an act of judicial narrowing, states enact legislation
that codifies the Court’s exemption, along with attendant procedural statutes that determine membership in the relevant
category.69
64
Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme:
Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1295 (1997).
65
Id. Many scholars have contended that Furman’s commitment to “genuine
narrowing” is not reflected in contemporary Supreme Court doctrine, particularly
with respect to the requirement that state narrowing statutes meaningfully shrink
the class of death-eligible crimes. See infra notes 250–259 and accompanying
text.
66
CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 163 (2016) [hereinafter STEIKER & STEIKER, COURTING
DEATH].
67
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (finding execution unconstitutional for those suffering from insanity); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
823, 838 (1988) (finding death sentences unconstitutional for those under 16);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002) (finding death sentences unconstitutional for those with intellectual disabilities); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578 (2005) (finding death sentences unconstitutional for those under 18).
68
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (finding the death penalty
unconstitutional as a punishment for the rape of an adult woman); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (finding the death penalty unconstitutional
for the rape of a child).
69
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-24-1–7 (codifying procedures concerning a defendant’s assessment for intellectual disability).

R
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B. Paradox or Counterbalance?
Scholars have long observed the tension in the narrowing
and individualized sentencing requirements and have debated
whether they can be reconciled.70 Scott Sundby has coined
this tension “the Lockett paradox.”71 In their comprehensive
book about the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence,
Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker described this question as
the “central tension in American death penalty law.”72 Vivian
Berger has likened the two values to conjoined twins—“locked
at the hip but straining uncomfortably in opposite
directions.”73
This tension was not lost on the Justices, several of whom
had commented on it as early as Lockett, where Justice Rehnquist lamented that the Court’s conception of the individualized sentencing requirement undermined the goals of the
narrowing requirement:
[T]he new constitutional doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences, but will
codify and institutionalize it. By encouraging defendants in
capital cases, and presumably sentencing judges and juries,
to take into consideration anything under the sun as a “mitigating circumstance,” it will not guide sentencing discretion
but will totally unleash it.74

Justice Scalia later lamented the “simultaneous pursuit of
contradictory objectives” and likened the tension between the
two principles as that “between the Allies and the Axis Powers
in World War II.”75
70
See, e.g., Vivian Berger, “Black Box Decisions” on Life or Death—If They’re
Arbitrary, Don’t Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 1067, 1080 (1991) (discussing the tension between objectivity
and subjectivity in sentencing); Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323,
325 (1992) (arguing that due to tension between ensuring individualized sentencing and limiting arbitrariness, the Court has not resolved whether a sentence
should concern a defendant’s culpability or general deserts); Scott E. Sundby, The
Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1206 (1991) (discussing the tension between
controlled discretion and individualized consideration in sentencing); STEIKER &
STEIKER, COURTING DEATH, supra note 66, at 164–65 (discussing the tensions between the discretion to impose and the discretion to withhold the death penalty);
see also Stephen P. Garvey, ‘‘As the Gentle Rain from Heaven’’: Mercy in Capital
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 995–1002 (1996) (discussing the “paradox”
created by the dual aims of consistency and individualized sentencing).
71
See Sundby, supra note 70, at 1206.
72
STEIKER & STEIKER, COURTING DEATH, supra note 66, at 165.
73
Berger, supra note 70, at 1080.
74
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664, 667 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).

R
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On the other hand, Justice Stevens maintained that the
two requirements were not only reconcilable, but they were
also both critical to achieving constitutionally reliable sentencing outcomes.76 Adopting a metaphor from the Georgia Supreme Court, Justice Stevens contended that tension between
the two principles dissipated if one conceived of the law as
applied to all homicide crimes as a pyramid divided into three
planes, where the possible punishment for each crime increased as one moved up the pyramid.77 The plane at the base
of the pyramid separated homicides from killings generally; the
middle plane consisted of death-eligible homicides; and the
plane at the top consisted of cases where death was actually
imposed.78 If the sentencer’s discretion was inversely proportional to the degree of punishment, the twin objectives of nonarbitrariness and individualized sentencing were both achievable.79 Stevens explained that Scalia’s conclusions were flawed:
Justice Scalia ignores the difference between the base of the
pyramid and its apex. A rule that forbids unguided discretion at the base is completely consistent with one that requires discretion at the apex. After narrowing the class of
cases to those at the tip of the pyramid, it is then appropriate
to allow the sentencer discretion to show mercy based on
individual mitigating circumstances in the cases that
remain.80

To Justice Stevens, the disparate treatment made death
sentences less arbitrary but more reliable because narrowing
discretion on the front end minimized the number of death
sentences, and increasing the juror’s discretion on the back
end allowed them to impose death only on the most “worthy.”81
In this way, the constraints of a narrowing requirement served
as a counterbalance to the increased discretion inherent in
individualized sentencing.

76

Id. at 716–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens borrowed the pyramid
model from the Georgia Supreme Court, as quoted by the Court in Zant v. Stephens. Id. at 716–18 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 870–72 (1983)).
78
Id. at 716–17. James Liebman conceives of the principles as a circle, with
the border of the circle excluding death-eligible crimes and dots within the circle
indicating death sentences. Liebman, supra note 15, at 8–13 (Figures 1 and 2).
More aggravated murders are illustrated by dots closer to the center of the circle,
while a wedge is carved out to capture racially biased death sentences. Id.
79
Walton, 497 U.S. at 717–18.
80
Id. at 718.
81
Id. at 718–19.
77

R
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II
CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT
In this Part, I examine the rise of the Supreme Court’s
“children are different” jurisprudence and discuss how it
evolved out of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. I discuss the similarities and differences in the two lines of cases.
The Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence began as
a subsection of death penalty proportionality jurisprudence
that outlawed the execution of juveniles in recognition of their
reduced culpability. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court exempted children under 16 from the death penalty in recognition that they are “less mature and responsible,” and cited
Justice Powell’s conclusion in a previous opinion that they are
“more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined
than adults.”82 The Court also noted that “[i]nexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the
same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere
emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.”83 This reduced
culpability meant that the death penalty rationale of retribution was not served by sentencing children to death; nor was
that of deterrence, where the Court concluded that “[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of costbenefit analysis” when undertaking a capital crime “is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”84
Seventeen years later, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court expanded the prohibition against execution to children who were
under 18 at the time of their crime.85 Drawing on the majority
opinion in Thompson, along with contemporary scientific findings, Roper identified three areas in which children differed
from adults, rendering them less culpable.86 The first was their
immaturity and “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,”
which the Court stated often resulted in impetuous behavior.87
The second was their vulnerability to negative influences and
82
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823, 834 (1988) (citing Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982) (internal quotation omitted)). An additional basis for the holding was the rarity with which sentences of death had been
imposed on children of this age. Id. at 826–29.
83
Id. at 835.
84
Id. at 836–37.
85
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). Roper overturned the intervening case Stanford v. Kentucky, which found 16- and 17-year-olds eligible for
execution. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
86
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
87
Id. at 569.
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peer pressure.88 The third was their capacity for change, resulting from personality traits that are not yet fixed.89 In light
of these three traits, the Court concluded that it was “suspect”
that a child could “fall[ ] among the worst offenders” for whom
the death penalty was intended.90 While granting the theoretical point that a child could exist who displayed adequate maturity and depravity to warrant a death sentence—a child who
exhibited “irreparable corruption” instead of “transient immaturity”—the Court noted that, in reality, these qualities would
be nearly impossible to prove.91 The Court also raised the concern that jurors might erroneously consider the characteristics
of youth to be aggravating, instead of mitigating, just as the
prosecutor in Roper had urged them to do during the sentencing phase of the defendant’s capital trial.92 Ultimately, the
Court found a categorical bar was necessary to prevent any
undeserving children from suffering this fate: “The differences
between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the
death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”93
The “children are different” jurisprudence sloughed off its
death penalty cloak when the Court next invoked it in the context of children sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. 2010’s Graham v. Florida applied the proportionality analysis previously reserved for death penalty
cases to categorically ban life without parole for children under
the age of 18 who had committed non-homicide crimes.94 Graham adopted much of Roper’s reasoning, focusing on the reduced culpability of children in light of their three areas of
difference: immaturity, vulnerability, and changeability.95
While acknowledging the uniqueness of the death penalty, the
Court found that life without parole had much in common with
death sentences: both sentences involved an irrevocable and
permanent loss of liberty that render rehabilitation immate88

Id.
Id. at 570.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 573.
92
Id. at 558, 573 (discussing the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, “Think
about age. Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.”). Elizabeth Emens has
argued that this concern served as significant motivation for Justice Kennedy’s
decision in Roper. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons
and Age Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 72–81.
93
Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73.
94
560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
95
Id. at 68.
89
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rial.96 When applied to children, life without parole took on a
uniquely severe quality: “Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old
and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive
the same punishment in name only.”97
Characterizing the culpability of the Graham cohort as
“twice diminished,” the Court found that the penological justifications for sentences of life without parole were not served
when applied to children who did not kill or intend to kill.98
The Court borrowed analysis that originated in Thompson in
finding that reduced culpability negated the need for retribution, while the impulsivity of youth made deterrence unlikely.99
It then addressed the two additional justifications and found
that changeability reduced the need for incapacitation and increased the likelihood of rehabilitation—an aim not incentivized by permanent imprisonment.100 As it had in the capital
context, the Court concluded that a categorical bar was necessary to avoid the risk that a child undeserving of life without
parole would nevertheless receive it.101 The Court explained
that the “discretionary, subjective judgment” of a sentencing
judge or jury was “insufficient to prevent the possibility that
the offender will receive a life without parole sentence for which
he or she lacks the moral culpability.”102 It rejected the State’s
call for a case-by-case approach, citing the need for boundaries, and expressing skepticism that sentencers could accurately distinguish between the few children who were
permanently incorrigible and the many who had the capacity
for change.103 The Court also warned that sentencers were
likely to become fixated on the facts of the crime to the exclusion of mitigating evidence: “[A]n ‘unacceptable likelihood
exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on
youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s
objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity
should require a sentence less severe than death.’”104 The
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 69, 71–74.
Id. at 71–72; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836–37 (1988).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–74.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 78 (quoting Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
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Court concluded that the Graham cohort was entitled to a
“meaningful opportunity” for release that would enable each
individual to demonstrate maturity and reform.105
To this point, the “children are different” jurisprudence
was synonymous with exempting children from the most severe
punishments, but in 2012’s Miller v. Alabama,106 the Court
began to adopt some of the requirements previously reserved
for capital cases. In Miller, the Court invalidated mandatory
sentences of life without parole for children under the age of 18
who were convicted of homicide crimes.107 The Court held that
such sentences violated the Eighth Amendment for two reasons: first, they failed to account for young people’s diminished
culpability and greater capacity for change; and second, they
“r[an] afoul of our cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties.”108 Of
course, before Miller, the “most serious penalties” had only included death sentences.109 In support of the reduced culpability conclusion, the Court revisited Roper’s three categories of
differences between children and adults and underscored the
conclusions of neurological studies that indicated developing
brains were more like to display “transient rashness, proclivity
for risk, and inability to assess consequences.”110 The Court
emphasized that none of these qualities were crime specific:
they existed whether the child in question had committed a
misdemeanor or a capital murder.111
To justify invoking the individualized sentencing doctrine,
the Court reinvigorated the analogy Graham drew between life
imprisonment without parole for juveniles and capital punishment, pronouncing the former “akin to the death penalty,” and
observing that Graham’s exemption of non-homicide crimes
from a particular punishment paralleled similar holdings in
death penalty cases.112 Because of these similarities, the
105

Id. at 79.
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (affirming mandatory life
without parole sentence for possession of 650 grams of cocaine and finding that
the individualized sentencing requirement may not be extended outside the capital context). But see William W. Berry III, Individualized Sentencing, 76 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 13, 16 (2019) (arguing that Miller creates a foothold for extending the
individualized sentencing requirement to other serious felony cases).
110
Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 472 n.5 (alteration in original).
111
Id. at 473.
112
Id. at 470, 474–75 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 407 (2008)
(rendering rape of a child ineligible for capital punishment)); Coker v. Georgia, 433
106
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Court concluded, its death penalty jurisprudence was applicable in the juvenile life without parole context.113 The Court
then focused its analysis on the death penalty’s individualized
sentencing requirement, emphasizing that mandatory sentencing schemes prevented consideration of “the mitigating qualities of youth,” as Graham and Roper had compelled.114 The
Court discussed the type of evidence that mandatory sentencing precluded assessment of, including “age and its hallmark
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences”; “the family and home environment”; the circumstances of the crime, including the degree of participation and extent of peer pressure;
“incompetencies associated with youth,” including difficulties
interacting with police or assisting attorneys; and capacity for
rehabilitation—before holding that sentencers must have the
ability to consider these “mitigating circumstances” before imposing life without parole.115
While the Court adopted the death penalty’s individualized
sentencing requirement for the Miller cohort, it made no mention of its counterweight, the narrowing requirement. Indeed,
the aim of Miller was to expand sentencer discretion, which was
nonexistent so long as life without parole was mandatory.116
While the Court compelled sentencers to “consider mitigating
circumstances” and suggested in dicta what some of these mitigating circumstances might include,117 it neglected to require
states to limit the eligibility for life without parole to particularly egregious homicides or to require a finding of aggravating
circumstances before imposing this sentence on children. As a
consequence of failing to explicitly require formal guidelines of
any kind, Miller arguably left the discretion of sentencers unfetU.S. 584, 584 (1977) (rendering rape of an adult ineligible for capital
punishment).
113
Miller, 567 U.S. at 470, 475.
114
Id. at 474–76 (internal quotations omitted).
115
Id. at 474, 477–78, 489.
116
See id. at 477–78, 489 (“Discretionary sentencing in adult court would
provide different options: There, a judge or jury could choose, rather than a lifewithout-parole sentence, a lifetime prison term with the possibility of parole or a
lengthy term of years. It is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor deserves
a (much) harsher sentence than he would receive in juvenile court, while still not
thinking life-without-parole appropriate.”). The Court rejected the State’s argument that the discretion some judges retain when deciding whether to transfer
children to adult court was constitutionally adequate because transfer hearings
involve a different question than sentencing and often take place early in a case
when little information is known about the defendant’s circumstances. Id. at 489.
117
Id. at 477–78, 489.
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tered, provided they “considered” the defendant’s
youthfulness.118
While the Court was silent concerning any formal state
narrowing requirement, there is reason to believe that the
Miller Court did intend some limitations. Although not binding,
Justice Breyer’s concurrence performs a modest offense-based
narrowing function by finding that the Eighth Amendment explicitly limits life without parole sentences to intentional homicides and specifically excludes felony murder.119 Moreover, the
majority opinion concluded that, in light of children’s reduced
culpability and capacity for change, sentences of life without
parole would be “uncommon.”120 The Court clarified that this
was particularly so because of the difficulty sentencers were
likely to have “distinguishing . . . between ‘the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and
the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’”121 In doing so, the Court appeared to fashion two
substantive guidelines for sentencers: (1) life without imprisonment should be imposed rarely; and (2) it is an appropriate
punishment only for defendants whose corruption is
irreparable.
These sentencer guidelines received reinforcement in Montgomery v. Louisiana, a decision exploring the retroactivity of
Miller.122 To find Miller retroactive, the Court had to determine
whether its holding amounted to a new substantive rule of
constitutional law or merely found that new criminal procedures are constitutionally required to impose life without parole on children convicted of homicides.123 The Court defined
substantive rules as those that limit the state’s power to punish: “Substantive rules . . . set forth categorical constitutional
guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments
118
The failure to explicitly require guidelines in Miller opened the door to the
success of this very argument in Jones v. Mississippi. 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311
(2021) (“In Miller, the Court mandated ‘only that a sentencer follow a certain
process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before
imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.”).
119
Miller, 567 U.S. at 490–92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
120
Id. at 479 (majority opinion).
121
Id. at 479–80.
122
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
123
Id. at 198 (discussing retroactivity analysis under Teague v. Lane, 498 U.S.
288 (1989)). Teague also held that watershed rules of procedural law were retroactive; however, the Court eliminated this possibility in Edwards v. Vannoy. 141
S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021) (“It is time—probably long past time—to make explicit
what has become increasingly apparent to bench and bar over the last 32 years:
New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. The
watershed exception is moribund. It must ‘be regarded as retaining no vitality.’”).
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altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.”124 By contrast,
procedural rules control only the “manner of determining the
defendant’s culpability.”125 When a procedural error occurs,
the defendant’s confinement may nevertheless be lawful; however, such is not the case with a violation of substantive law.126
As a consequence, new substantive rules are retroactive, while
new procedural rules are not.127
In holding that Miller was retroactive, the Court found that
it substantively limited the state’s power to impose life without
parole on most children, whose homicide crimes reflect “the
transient immaturity of youth,” while permitting the power to
impose the punishment on “the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption.”128 Thus, for the “vast
majority” of children, life without parole is a sentence that the
state lacks the power to impose.129 While granting that Miller
had a procedural component in its requirement of an individualized sentencing hearing, the Court found that this procedure
simply gave defendants a mechanism to show that they were
members of the substantive category of people exempt from
punishment: here, those whose crimes indicated transient immaturity, as opposed to irreparable corruption.130 The hearing
thus did not supplant Miller’s substantive holding; rather, it
enforced it.131
While not explicitly discussed as imposing a formal narrowing requirement on states, the substantive limits that the
Montgomery Court held Miller placed on sentencers served to
theoretically function as such—albeit one judicially determined
and focused on attributes of the offender instead of the offense.132 By shrinking the class of children eligible for life without parole sentences to those whose crimes exhibited
124

Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 201.
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 202.
128
Id. at 206–08 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In this way,
Miller’s application of the proportionality doctrine may be read as an example of
judicial narrowing based on offender attributes. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
129
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209 (“Miller did bar life without parole, however,
for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility. For that reason, Miller is no less substantive than are Roper and
Graham.”).
130
Id. at 209–10.
131
Id. at 210 (“The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s
substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.”).
132
See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
125

R

R
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“irreparable corruption,” Miller and Montgomery appeared to
place a limitation on the discretion of sentencers, portending a
sea change in the way juveniles would be sentenced for serious
crimes. Their full-throated embrace of the analogy between the
adult death penalty and children sentenced to life without parole raised hopes that additional Eighth Amendment protections might follow. However, 2021’s Jones v. Mississippi, the
product of a more conservative Court, would abruptly reverse
this trend, upending any pretense of fettered discretion.
III
THE EMBRACE OF UNFETTERED DISCRETION
In this Part, I argue that the 2021 decision in Jones v.
Mississippi fundamentally altered the Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence by embracing unfettered discretion in
sentencing children convicted of homicide. In embracing individualized sentencing without the counterweight of the narrowing requirement, the Court has created conditions likely to
result in the arbitrary and racially discriminatory sentencing
outcomes that it eschewed when it found capital sentencing
unconstitutional in Furman.133 By cherry-picking safeguards
from its death penalty jurisprudence, the Court has ensured
that future life without parole sentences for children will have
the unintended result of violating the Eighth Amendment.
A. Jones and Unfettered Discretion
Following its decisions in Miller and Montgomery, the Court
had explicitly embraced the death penalty’s individualized sentencing requirement in the juvenile life without parole context.134 While it never explicitly mentioned a narrowing
requirement, aspects of Miller and Montgomery appeared to
place at least some limitations on sentencer discretion by mandating that life without parole sentences be “uncommon” and
reserved only for those children whose crimes indicated “permanent incorrigibility.”135
133
Contrary to what the Justices concluded in Furman, subsequent studies
revealed that the racial effects of death sentences were driven more by the identity
of the victim than that of the offender. In a famous example, the “Baldus study,”
which consisted of two statistical studies by Professors David C. Baldus, Charles
Pulaski, and George Woodworth, analyzed over 2,000 Georgia murder cases
before concluding that capital defendants who killed white victims were 4.3 times
as likely to receive a death sentence as those who killed Black victims. See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987).
134
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012); Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208.
135
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80; Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208–09.
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The state of Virginia originally challenged Montgomery’s interpretation of Miller, when it sought certiorari in response to
the Fourth Circuit’s reversal of the life without parole sentence
of Lee Boyd Malvo, the teenage participant in the infamous
D.C. Sniper case.136 The state contended that Montgomery had
inappropriately expanded Miller’s holding, primarily by suggesting that the ruling barred non-mandatory sentences of life
without parole where the sentencer failed to determine whether
a defendant’s crimes were consistent with permanent incorrigibility.137 The Court granted certiorari, and while the oral argument focused on the non-mandatory question, multiple
justices made clear that they viewed Miller as having held that
life without parole was only appropriate for “the irretrievably
corrupt.”138 In particular, Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Kagan agreed on this point:
JUSTICE KAGAN: That’s –that’s just to say you wish Montgomery was a different opinion. It’s not a different opinion. It
-it —it creates the test that it creates based on the language
in Miller, which, you’re right, was based on the language in
Roper, . . . but there’s a clear rule that comes out of it, which
is this distinction between the irretrievably corrupt and all
others.
MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor, I don’t think it’s an especially
clear rule, in part because it kind of —if I may use the word
fudges a little bit the way this Court’s described substantive
rules by describing it in procedural terms. Usually, you describe a class by reference to some objective fact, like –
...
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Sorry. The objective fact is the
incorrigible.
136
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1–3, Mathena v. Malvo, 140 S. Ct. 919
(2020) (No. 18-217), 2018 WL 3993386. The “D.C. Sniper” case refers to the 2002
sniper shootings of more than twelve random people in the D.C. metro area,
including parts of Maryland and Virginia. Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 267
(4th Cir. 2018), abrogated by Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021). John
Allen Muhammed and then 17-year-old Lee Boyd Malvo were convicted of the
murders. Amy Howe, Justices Grant Four New Cases (Corrected), SCOTUSBLOG,
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/justices-grant-fournew-cases-2/ [https://perma.cc/BG8T-Y924]. Muhammad was sentenced to
death and was executed in 2009, while the teenaged Malvo received multiple life
without parole sentences. Id.
137
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 136 at 16; Brief for Petitioner at 6,
Mathena v. Malvo, 140 S. Ct. 1919 (2020) (No. 18-217), 2019 WL 2500424.
138
Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–32, Mathena v. Malvo, 140 S. Ct. 919
(2020) (No. 18-217), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-217_5hdk.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N5Z-M5CZ] [hereinafter Transcript of Malvo Oral Argument].
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...
JUSTICE KAGAN: Those are the people who can’t —you cannot sentence in a certain kind of way.
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Right.
MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor, I think, and Justice Kavanaugh was just getting at this, it’s not really an objective fact.
It’s a judgment that someone’s going to have to make. As the
Court –
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But that’s the category –that’s –I’m
done.139

The Court never reached a conclusion in Malvo because
Virginia subsequently enacted legislation that rendered all
children sentenced to life imprisonment parole eligible after
twenty years of incarceration.140 Because the issue was now
moot as to Mr. Malvo, the parties filed an agreement asking the
Court to dismiss the petition, and the Court complied.141
Two weeks later, the Court granted certiorari in Jones v.
Mississippi.142 In that case, Brett Jones had initially been sentenced to mandatory life without parole in 2004 for killing his
grandfather.143 Following Miller, he was granted a new sentencing hearing, where he was again sentenced to life without
parole, despite having introduced evidence of his rehabilitation
while in prison.144 In explaining his decision, the resentencing
judge failed to determine whether Jones was permanently incorrigible but instead indicated his understanding that “Miller
requires that the sentencing authority consider both mitigating
and the aggravating circumstances.”145 The court further explained its decision by noting the brutality of the murder and
the lack of any evidence that then-15-year-old Jones had “inescapable home circumstances.”146
139
Id. at 30–31. Eric C. Feigin was the assistant solicitor general for the
United States who argued the case as amicus curiae in support of the Virginia
warden.
140
U.S. Supreme Court Dismisses Juvenile Life Without Parole Case Following
New Virginia Legislation, A.B.A. (Mar. 10, 2020) https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2020/spring/
us-supreme-court-juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/C9CM-689S].
141
Mathena v. Malvo, 140 S. Ct. 919 (2020).
142
140 S. Ct. 1293 (2020).
143
Jones v. State, 285 So. 3d 626, 628–29 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
144
Id. at 630–31.
145
Jones v. State, No. 2015-CT-00899-SCT, 2018 WL 10700848, at *6 (Miss.
Nov. 27, 2018) (en banc) (quoting state appellate court judge).
146
Id. at *7.
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question
of whether sentencing judges must determine that a child is
permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life
without parole. Although not explicitly framed as such, the
case proceeded as a contest concerning sentencer discretion.
The petitioner argued for a limit placed on discretion: because
Miller banned life without parole sentences for all but the permanently incorrigible, the sentencing court must first determine that a defendant is permanently incorrigible before
imposing a sentence of life without parole.147 In doing so, the
petitioner harkened to the judicially determined narrowing of
the Court’s proportionality jurisprudence.148 He characterized
the permanent incorrigibility standard as an “eligibility rule”
and compared the requested determination to the required
finding that a defendant lacked intellectual disability before the
death penalty could be imposed:
[W]hen it is an eligibility rule like we have here, . . . it is like
the Atkins eligibility rule based on intellectual disability or
the Ford eligibility rule based on . . . insanity.
In those cases, the Court requires a determination. It
may not be a formal finding, and, again, that is not what we
are saying is required here, but the judge has to determine
whether the defendant fits within the class that can be subjected to the punishment . . . .149

Without the permanent incorrigibility standard as a gatekeeper, the petitioner argued, Miller sentencing would become
a “free-for-all.”150
The State eschewed this interpretation and argued that
Miller only required discretionary sentencing: sentencers must
merely consider a defendant’s “youth and its attendant characteristics before exercising discretion to impose a life-withoutparole sentence.”151 Appearing as amicus curiae in support of
Mississippi, the Solicitor General’s Office argued that the very
act of sentencing a child to life without parole rendered the
147
Transcript of Oral Argument at 84–85, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct.
1307 (2021) (No. 18-1259), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/18-1259_e2p3.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWM6-3E88]
[hereinafter Transcript of Jones Oral Argument].
148
See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
149
Transcript of Jones Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 22, 33–34; see also
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2021) (“Jones analogizes to cases
where the Court has recognized certain eligibility criteria, such as sanity or a lack
of intellectual disability, that must be met before an offender can be sentenced to
death.”).
150
Transcript of Jones Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 86.
151
Id. at 40–41.

R
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child “permanently incorrigible” because it constituted the
judge’s determination that the “the distinctive attributes of
youth have [not] diminished the penological justifications for
life without parole.”152
In a 6-3 decision along ideological lines, Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion sided with the State, holding that,
despite Montgomery’s ruling that Miller put forth a substantive
rule, “[i]n Miller, the Court mandated ‘only that a sentencer
follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and
attendant characteristics—before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.”153 Had the Court treated permanent incorrigibility as an eligibility factor, as the petitioner urged, it would
have functioned as a de facto narrowing requirement, requiring
the Court to exempt from life without parole sentences certain
offenders—children who put forth credible evidence that they
were capable of rehabilitation. By narrowing the class of offenders to the theoretical “worst of the worst,” this requirement
would have functioned to fulfill Miller’s mandate that such
sentences be “uncommon.” By instead relegating Miller’s requirement to mere consideration of youth, the Court rejected
any meaningful, substantive limits on sentencer discretion.
But the opinion did not stop there. The Court concluded
not only that sentencers need not determine whether a defendant is “permanently incorrigible” but also that the Constitution did not require them to engage in fact finding of any kind
before imposing a life without parole sentence.154 Justice Kavanaugh made clear that judges need not ever explain their
reasoning before sentencing a child to life without parole.155
Instead, just as they are in the adult federal sentencing context, judges are presumed to follow the law:
[A]n on-the-record sentencing explanation is not necessary to
ensure that a sentencer considers a defendant’s youth. . . .
[I]f the sentencer has discretion to consider the defendant’s
152

Id. at 67–68.
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1311 (emphasis added). Justice Thomas concurred in
the judgment but wrote separately that the Court should have held that Montgomery was wrongly decided. Id. at 1323 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he majority
adopts a strained reading of Montgomery v. Louisiana, instead of outright admitting that it is irreconcilable with Miller v. Alabama—and the Constitution. The
better approach is to be patently clear that Montgomery was a ‘demonstrably
erroneous’ decision worthy of outright rejection.” (internal citations omitted)).
154
Id. at 1311, 1323 (holding that the constitution does not demand “policy
approaches” such as requiring sentencers to engage in fact finding or directing
them to “explain on the record why a life-without-parole sentence is appropriate
notwithstanding the defendant’s youth”).
155
Id. at 1323.
153
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youth, the sentencer necessarily will consider the defendant’s
youth, especially if defense counsel advances an argument
based on the defendant’s youth. Faced with a convicted murderer who was under 18 at the time of the offense and with
defense arguments focused on the defendant’s youth, it
would be all but impossible for a sentencer to avoid considering that mitigating factor.156

By reducing the requirement of “considering” to a pro
forma act, the Court rendered sentencer discretion nearly limitless. Moreover, in this regime, the only way a life without
parole sentence could be deemed unconstitutional under Miller
would be in the unlikely event that the sentencing judge was to
“expressly refuse[ ] as a matter of law to consider the defendant’s youth.”157
The Court’s opinion thus leaves these sentencing decisions
practically unreviewable. While Justice Kavanaugh ostensibly
left the door open for individuals like Jones to raise an asapplied Eighth Amendment claim based on disproportionate
sentencing,158 this avenue provides no realistic hope of relief.
The Court has made clear—even in the death penalty context—
that the Eighth Amendment does not require comparative proportionality review, where courts would assess a defendant’s
sentence in the context of others who received life without parole sentences to determine if the defendant is an outlier.159
This leaves traditional proportionality review, where the reviewing court determines if the defendant’s individual sentence is
disproportionate to the offense in light of the penological goals
served by the sentence.160 Because sentencing is a factual
determination, the standard of review in these cases is highly
deferential,161 with appellate courts typically affirming unless
156

Id. 1319 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1320 n.7.
158
What exactly this claim would entail is up for debate. William Berry has
argued that individual as-applied challenges in the Miller context should receive
heightened scrutiny. See William W. Berry III, The Evolving Standards, As-Applied (July 15, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Berry, Evolving Standards].
159
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984).
160
See William W. Berry III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69,
72–73, 92 (2011) (discussing individual proportionality analysis of death
sentences); Penny J. White, Can Lightning Strike Twice? Obligations of State
Courts After Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 813, 833 (1999) (referencing
“traditional” proportionality review where a reviewing court determines the sentence is “disproportionate to the offense”).
161
See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591, 608 (2009) (“[B]ecause of the
factual nature of criminal cases, trial courts have considerable influence on caseby-case outcomes.”).
157
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the sentencing decision amounts to an abuse of discretion. In
discussing the as-applied challenge, the Court cited to Harmelin v. Michigan,162 a case where it upheld the constitutionality
of a life without parole sentence for an adult convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.163 Should reviewing courts apply Harmelin,164 it is hard to imagine them reversing the same
sentence when it was imposed for a homicide crime.
That this level of discretion might result in arbitrary sentencing outcomes was not lost on the Court, nor was it a concern. The Court seemed to take as given the fact that sentencer
identity alone would determine some outcomes: “Some
sentencers may decide that a defendant’s youth supports a
sentence less than life without parole. Other sentencers
presented with the same facts might decide that life without
parole remains appropriate despite the defendant’s youth.”165
This concession may have been an attempt to divorce the
Court’s child sentencing jurisprudence from its death penalty
jurisprudence so that advocates would be less likely to demand
the same procedural protections. Justice Kavanaugh summed
up the Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence in this
limited way: “Youth matters in sentencing.”166 By so stating,
he sent a message to sentencing judges, like the judge who
reimposed life without parole on Evan Miller: the Court would
not interfere in these decisions.
B. The Dangers of Unfettered Discretion
The Jones Court’s conferral of discretion on sentencing
judges to impose life without parole sentences on children—
fettered only by a nearly unreviewable command to “consider”
the defendant’s youth—is a recipe for arbitrary and racially
discriminatory sentencing outcomes. The problem of discretion in the criminal legal system has long been a topic of debate
162

501 U.S. 957 (1991).
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1322 (2021) (citing Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 996–1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
164
In her dissenting opinion in Jones, Justice Sotomayor noted that because
Harmelin applied to adults, it was an inappropriate lens with which to view an asapplied Eighth Amendment proportionality claim concerning a child. Id. at 1337
n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Instead, she urged reviewing courts to apply the
Miller and Montgomery proportionality analysis, i.e., that a sentence of life without
parole is unconstitutional for a child displaying “transient immaturity.” Id. In so
stating, she emphasized that the majority opinion makes clear that Miller and
Montgomery are binding authority: “For present purposes, sentencers should hold
this Court to its word: Miller and Montgomery are still good law.” Id. at 1337.
165
Id. at 1319 (majority opinion).
166
Id. at 1316.
163
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in the legal literature. Scholars have criticized unfettered discretion in the context of prosecutorial power,167 federal sentencing,168 and capital juries.169 Empirical evidence has
established that, without guidance, human actors rely on intuition, which factors their own personal prejudices and biases
into decision-making.170
Unfettered discretion can have particularly negative effects
on Black defendants and on defendants accused of harming
white victims.171 Stereotype activation, where unconscious
167
See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit
Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795,
805 (2012) (finding that prosecutors, who “enjoy more unreviewable discretion
than any other actor in the criminal justice system,” are susceptible to unconscious bias in decision-making); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1555 (1981) (“The risk of unequal
treatment created by standardless discretion is troubling not only as a threat to
due process but in its own right as well. Giving prosecutors the power to invoke or
deny punishment at their discretion raises the prospect that society’s most fundamental sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously and that the least
favored members of the community – racial and ethnic minorities, social outcasts,
the poor – will be treated most harshly.”).
168
See, e.g., Kreiner Ramirez, supra note 161 (arguing judges no longer bound
by federal sentencing guidelines will fall prey to unconscious biases unless they
take affirmative steps to become culturally competent).
169
See Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 837–48 (arguing that
capital juries, which are disproportionately white, have the “power to discriminate” because of the lack of guidelines about what constitutes mitigating factors
in individualized sentencing procedures).
170
Kreiner Ramirez, supra note 161, at 592; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3, 5, 31 (2007) (concluding after empirical study that “judges
generally make intuitive decisions but sometimes override their intuition with
deliberation” and that their “intuition is also the likely pathway by which undesirable influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal
system”); Smith & Levinson, supra note 167, at 797 (arguing that “implicit racial
attitudes and stereotypes skew prosecutorial decisions in a range of racially biased ways”); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race
of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1819 (1998) (suggesting
unconscious biases in prosecutors result from their similarities with victims).
171
See, e.g., Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 838–40 (discussing empirical studies indicating that the death penalty is disproportionately imposed on Black defendants and those convicted of killing white victims); Justin D.
Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Koichi Hioki, Race and Retribution: An Empirical
Study of Implicit Bias and Punishment in America, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839, 844
(2019) (study of 500 potential jurors finding that “participants more strongly
associated Black faces with the concepts of retribution, payback, and revenge,
and White faces with the concepts of rehabilitation, treatment, and redemption”);
M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301, 329 (2018) (“Whether because
of language and demeanor that differs from the court’s cultural expectations or
through a priori biased character assessments, sentencing authorities are likely
to view African American defendants’ expressions of remorse as insincere.”);
Aneeta Rattan, Cynthia S. Levine, Carol S. Dweck & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Race
and the Fragility of the Legal Distinction Between Juveniles and Adults, 7 PLOS
ONE, e36680 (2012) (study of 735 white Americans indicating that, when
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bias fueled by white supremacy infiltrates decision-making, explains much of this behavior.172 Social psychologists have concluded that people subconsciously construct positive or
negative associations based on group membership in, among
other things, a particular race.173 Americans tend to associate
Blackness with negative traits, such as criminality, deviance,
and retribution, and whiteness with positive traits, such as
good citizenship, rehabilitation, and a propensity for victimhood.174 A series of four studies found that people tend to
view Black children as older and less innocent than white children.175 Decision makers can fall prey to these associations
when environmental cues activate these stereotypes, often unconsciously.176 Stereotype activation can also lead to confirpresented a scenario involving a rape by a Black juvenile defendant, participants
viewed juveniles as having culpability more similar to adults and indicated more
support for harsh sentencing than they did when the same scenario involved a
white juvenile defendant); Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes
and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 242, 242 (2002) (discussing over
100 studies that demonstrate that White people have “automatic negative associations” with Black or other non-white groups); see also Andrew E. Taslitz,
Racial Threat Versus Racial Empathy in Sentencing—Capital and Otherwise, 41
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 20 (2013) (“[T]he kinds of vague instructions about the jury’s
deliberative task that are used in capital cases, combined with the absence of
instructions designed to promote empathy for the offender, can further enable the
jury’s emotional distancing from a black capital defendant.”).
172
Jamie L. Flexon, Addressing Contradictions with the Social Psychology of
Capital Juries and Racial Bias, in RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE LEGACY OF
MCCLESKEY V. KEMP, 113–19 (David P. Keys & R. J. Maratea eds., 2016) (discussing
stereotype activation); Blair, supra note 171 (“[E]ven subliminally presented cues
[can] activate stereotypes, and furthermore, those activated stereotypes could
influence interpersonal judgments.”). See generally CHERYL STAATS, KIRWAN INST.
FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW
2014, http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/79MU-MKPJ] (cataloguing thirty years of social
science research on unconscious racial bias); Gordon B. Moskowitz, Peter M.
Gollwitzer, Wolfgang Wasel & Bernd Schaal, Preconscious Control of Stereotype
Activation Through Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 167
(1999).
173
Kreiner Ramirez, supra note 161, at 592. See generally STAATS, supra note
172.
174
Levinson, Smith & Hioki, supra note 171, at 844; William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Compositions, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 171, 219 (2001) (“[C]ulturally rooted racial stereotypes may tend to
demonize and dehumanize blacks accused of lethal violence by portraying them
as especially dangerous.”) [hereinafter Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death Sentencing]; Flexon, supra note 172, at 113.
175
Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew Christian Jackson, Brooke Allison Lewis Di
Leone, Carmen Marie Culotta & Natalie Ann DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 526, 540 (2014).
176
Flexon, supra note 172, at 114.
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mation bias, where people discount evidence that conflicts with
their preconceived notions.177
A decision maker’s identity is also critical, because research indicates that people tend to favor members of their own
group.178 Studies have consistently demonstrated that people
tend to associate members of out-groups with non-human animals at a greater rate than they do members of their in-group,
contributing to the dehumanization of out-group members.179
Decision maker identity has been studied extensively in the
capital sentencing context.180 All-white juries are the most
likely to impose death sentences.181 Juries with five or more
white male members significantly increased the likelihood of a
death sentence in cases involving Black defendants and white
victims.182 Conversely, the presence of even a single Black
man on the jury is significant: when at least one juror was an
African-American male, the juries imposed death sentences in
only 42.9% of cases, compared to 71.9% when none of the
jurors were African Americans.183
Studies have shown that judges possess the same implicit
biases as lay people and that these biases impact their judgment.184 Moreover, nearly 90% of judges must stand for popular election at some point.185 While it is debatable whether
judges as a whole impose harsher sentences than juries,186 in
the capital context, elected judges frequently overrode the life
verdicts rendered by juries to impose a death sentence, but
177
JON A. KROSNICK & RICHARD E. PETTY, ATTITUDE STRENGTH: ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES 8 (Richard E. Petty & Jon A. Krosnick eds., 1995).
178
Kreiner Ramirez, supra note 161, at 592.
179
Goff, Jackson, Di Leone, Culotta & DiTomasso, supra note 175, at 527.
180
I have argued in a previous article that the modern death penalty fails to
meaningfully guide juror discretion at the sentencing stage. Miller, Power to
Discriminate, supra note 25.
181
See Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death Sentencing, supra note 174, at 193
n.104.
182
Id. at 192–93.
183
Id. at 193–94.
184
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie,
Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195,
1197 (2009).
185
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Part II: Report to the ALI Concerning
Capital Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REV. 367, 392 (2010) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker,
ALI Report].
186
Taslitz, supra note 171, at 23 (“Empirical research has also failed to definitely determine whether noncapital juries are harsher or more lenient than
judges.”); Brent L. Smith & Edward H. Stevens, Sentence Disparity and the JudgeJury Sentencing Debate: An Analysis of Robbery Sentences in Six Southern States,
9 CRIM. JUST. REV. 1, 6 (1984) (study of sentencing from 1957 to 1982 that concluded that judge sentencing was beginning to become as arbitrary as jury sentencing, and both types of sentences were increasing in severity).
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rarely did the opposite.187 There is also evidence that judicial
sentencing can be racially discriminatory. In Alabama, before
the practice of judicial override was outlawed in 2017,188 55%
of those sentenced to death via judicial override were African
American, and 75% of the crimes involved white victims.189 A
study of 216 people sentenced by Florida judges from 1998 to
2002 concluded that defendants with stronger Afrocentric features received longer sentences than other defendants.190 A
study finding that attitudes about sentencing vary significantly
across racial, gender, and educational strata, but are remarkably consistent within strata, has inspired one scholar to argue
for jury sentencing on the grounds that a judge’s single perspective is inherently inferior to the multiple perspectives
brought by jurors of different backgrounds.191 Moreover,
judges “come from fairly uniform racial and class backgrounds.”192 As of 2019, 80% of federal judges were white and
over 73% were male.193 Similarly, a 2017 study of state court
judges revealed that 80% were white and nearly 70% were

187
Steiker & Steiker, ALI Report, supra note 185, at 393 n.90 (“Elected judges
in Alabama and Florida have been far more likely to use their power to override
jury verdicts to impose death when the jury has sentenced the convicted person to
life in prison than to replace a jury verdict of death with one of life. In contrast,
judges in Delaware, who do not stand for election, are far less likely to override in
favor of death than to override in favor of life.”). The practice of judicial override
ended in 2017, when Alabama, the lone remaining state allowing override, passed
legislation to outlaw it. Kent Faulk, Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey Signs Bill: Judges Can
No Longer Override Juries in Death Penalty Cases, ADVANCE LOCAL (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2017/04/post_317.html [https://
perma.cc/T65C-YUPC] [hereinafter Faulk, Alabama Governor].
188
Falk, Alabama Governor, supra note 187.
189
O.H. Eaton, Jr., Supreme Court Must Eradicate Judicial Override in Death
Penalty Cases, BL NEWS (Nov. 17, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/uslaw-week/supreme-court-must-eradicate-judicial-override-in-death-penaltycases [https://perma.cc/L2HW-W6NL].
190
William T. Pizzi, Irene V. Blair & Charles M. Judd, Discrimination in Sentencing on the Basis of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327, 345–52
(2005).
191
Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951,
986–87 (2003) (citing Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Offenders: An Analysis of the Public’s Views, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 223
(1980)).
192
Taslitz, supra note 171, at 23.
193
DANIELLE ROOT, JAKE FALESCHINI & GRACE OYENUBI, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, BUILDING A MORE INCLUSIVE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2019), https://americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/JudicialDiversity-report-3.pdf?_ga
=2.124532684.739342235.1658104696-1510815157.1658104696 [https://
perma.cc/Q78N-NLQR].
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male, leaving the authors to conclude that “[w]hite men dominate state courts.”194
Unfettered discretion exacerbates these problems, as
evinced by the arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes
of the pre-Furman death penalty. Prior to 1972, sentencers
had unlimited discretion to impose death for capital crimes.
Juries were instructed that the decision to impose death
should be “made according to their conscience, or in their sole
discretion, without any further elaboration.”195 As a result,
death sentences were levied on those convicted of burglary,
armed robbery, and kidnapping.196 At the same time, the Justices on the Furman Court noted that less than 20% of those
convicted for murder were actually sentenced to death.197 In
Georgia, home to the specific capital sentencing scheme under
review in Furman, and where all levels of homicide were deatheligible, the number was closer to 15%.198
Geography was often a determining factor, as southern
states were disproportionately responsible for executions. Of
the 3,859 persons executed between 1930 and 1967, 2,306 of
them—nearly 60%—were convicted and sentenced in southern
states.199 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund noted that, for this
time period, “[s]entences of death and executions for other
crimes than murder [were] virtually exclusively a southern phenomenon.”200 Evidence also suggested that racial discrimination factored into death sentences. Nearly half of those
194
Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Measuring Justice in State Courts: The
Demographics of the State Judiciary, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1887, 1903–08 (concluding
also that “[w]hite men account for roughly equal numbers of trial and appellate
judges on the state bench”); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal
Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV. 849, 878 (2014) (“Juries are better positioned to
assess matters reflecting their communities’ values than are judges because they
are more representative of their communities than judges. In contrast to judges,
juries are drawn from the local vicinage and are considered bodies ‘truly representative of the community.’”).
195
Steiker & Steiker, ALI Report, supra note 185, at 376; see also Brief for the
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and the National Office for
the Rights of the Indigent as Amici Curiae at 49–50, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969) (No. 642), 1968 WL 112750 (“[T]he selective judgments made at the
three most critical stages of a capital proceeding—the prosecutor’s decision
whether to seek the death penalty, the jury’s decision whether to impose it, and
the governor’s decision whether to commute it—are all made without the slightest
pretense of standards or guidelines.”) [hereinafter LDF Amicus Brief].
196
Steiker & Steiker, ALI Report, supra note 185, at 376.
197
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 386 n. 11 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 n.26 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 n.31 (1976).
198
Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 64, at 1288 n.28, 1289.
199
LDF Amicus Brief, supra note 195, at 44.
200
Id. at 45.
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executed for murder were Black defendants, as were 89% of
those executed for rape.201
Because life without parole is the juvenile equivalent of the
adult death penalty,202 arbitrary sentences would violate the
Eighth Amendment because they “are cruel and unusual in the
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”203 There was evidence of these effects even prior to
Jones, as states responded to Miller. The overall number of life
without parole sentences for children decreased significantly,
in part because 21 states and the District of Columbia outlawed the sentence.204 But from 2012 to 2018, racial disparities in life without parole sentences increased, as the end of
mandatory sentencing also increased judicial discretion in
states that retained the sentence.205 After Miller, 72% of those
receiving new sentences of life without parole were Black children compared to pre-Miller numbers of almost 61%.206 Nor
were these sentences uniformly distributed. Prosecutions in
Louisiana and Michigan far exceeded those in other states in
seeking life without parole.207 Louisiana was responsible for
nearly one-third of new life without parole sentences following
Miller.208 In re-sentencing hearings following Montgomery,
Louisiana prosecutors sought the reimposition of life without
parole in 30% of cases, while Michigan prosecutors did so in
201

Id. at 52.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010).
203
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Although many of the Furman justices expressed concerns about racially discriminatory outcomes, Stewart’s opinion only applied to arbitrary outcomes. Stewart
considered and dismissed as unproved the argument that the death penalty was
imposed in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 310 (“My concurring Brothers
have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these
few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.
But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side.” (citation
and footnotes omitted)). Arguments that an individual’s death sentence violates
the Equal Protection Clause under a disparate impact theory have failed because
the Court is unwilling to consider statistical evidence as a basis for proving the
claim. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
204
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 5 (2018), https://
cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D7YK9SQ]. Since Montgomery, the number of children serving life without parole
sentences has decreased 60%, from 2,800 to 1,100. Id. at 6.
205
Id. at 2. The relationship between increased discretion and increased racial discrepancies is only correlative. A larger study is needed to determine that
white defendants sentenced to life without parole were not disproportionately
found in states that banned these sentences following Miller.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 7.
208
Id.
202
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60% of cases.209 Following a 2017 50-state survey, the Associated Press observed that states had responded with “an uneven
patchwork of policies,” concluding that “[t]he odds of release or
continued imprisonment vary from state to state, even county
to county, in a pattern that can make justice seem
arbitrary.”210
A state’s degree of judicial discretion provides one explanation for these outcomes. In her dissenting opinion in Jones,
Justice Sotomayor compares the sentencing results in two
states: Mississippi and Pennsylvania.211 In Mississippi, where
the failure to require a finding of permanent incorrigibility left
judicial discretion unbounded, more than 25% of re-sentencings resulted in the re-imposition of life without parole; however, in Pennsylvania, where the state adopted procedural
guidelines to cabin judicial discretion, including a rebuttable
presumption against life without parole, only 2% of defendants
were re-sentenced to life without parole.212 One critic has observed a similar trend in federal court: “[T]he lack of workable
guidelines for district court judges faced with Miller defendants
has already resulted in a group of resentencing decisions that
wildly diverge for no legitimate reason.”213 While these conclusions observe correlations, more research is needed to conclusively demonstrate that unguided discretion has increased
arbitrariness and racially discriminatory outcomes following
Miller.
Despite its dangers, discretion is also an unavoidable part
of the criminal legal system. Rules cannot cover every conceivable scenario, requiring individuals to exercise judgment and
make decisions.214 One solution is to confine these decisions
within a set of guidelines or principles to minimize the risk of
209

Id.
Sharon Cohen & Adam Geller, AP Exclusive: Parole for Young Lifers Inconsistent Across US, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 31, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/
mo-state-wire-courts-ar-state-wire-mi-state-wire-north-america-a592b
421f7604e2b88a170b5b438235f [https://perma.cc/JR3F-ZQPG].
211
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1333–34 (2021) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
212
Id. at 1334.
213
Lucy Gray-Stack, Miller in Federal District Court: What the Stories of Six
Juvenile Lifers Reveal About the Need for New Federal Juvenile Sentencing Policy,
44 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 583 (2021).
214
Kreiner Ramirez, supra note 161, at 597–98; Roscoe Pound, Discretion,
Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 925, 926 (1960) (“Discretion is an authority conferred by law to act in
certain conditions or situations in accordance with an official’s or an official
agency’s own considered judgment and conscience. It is an idea of morals, belonging to the twilight zone between law and morals.”).
210
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arbitrariness and bias.215 In the next section, I discuss several
ways that sentencer discretion may be limited to minimize arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes in the child sentencing context.
IV
POSSIBLE STATE SOLUTIONS
With Jones’s endorsement of unfettered discretion, arbitrary and racially biased sentencing outcomes will likely increase. In this section, I discuss solutions that states may take
to curtail these results. The first and best solution to eliminate
these outcomes is for states to end life without parole
sentences for children. This was the path that many states
took following Miller, leaving just 16 states that actively sentence children to life without parole.216 Given the inherent
subjectivity involved in sentencing and the limitations on the
diversity of sentencers, eliminating these sentences is the only
way to prevent bias and randomness from impacting who is
sentenced to life without parole.217
For those states that choose to retain life without parole as
a sentence for children, I discuss possible procedural reforms.
I begin by rejecting the most obvious reform: voluntary adoption of a permanent incorrigibility standard. I explain why this
standard, though beneficial for some individuals, is unlikely to
reduce arbitrary and racially discriminatory sentencing outcomes. Next, I propose three procedural requirements that
215
Pound, supra note 214, at 927 (“It has been necessary to recognize that,
because there is no rule in the strict sense, it does not follow that a tribunal on the
one hand has no power to do justice, when appealed to therefor, or on the other
hand has unlimited power of doing what it chooses on any grounds or on no
grounds. It is to reach a reasoned decision in the light of principles.”); Guthrie,
Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 170, at 28 (interpreting results of empirical
study to deduce that existence of “a web of rules” limiting discretion to determine
probable cause “might enable trial judges to avoid the hindsight bias”); id. at 41
(“Multifactor tests can help ensure that judges consider all relevant factors and
can remind them of their responsibility to base decisions on more than mere
intuition.”); Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 848 (arguing that
capital jurors’ unfettered discretion to consider mitigating evidence in sentencing
imbues them with a “power to discriminate”).
216
Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (May 24, 2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juve
nile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/HA5P-BUHV]. Life without parole is
not permitted in twenty-five states currently. Id. Nine more states theoretically
permit the sentence but have no one serving it. Id.
217
Charles Black famously made this point in the capital context, arguing
human frailty would inevitably infect capital sentencing outcomes. CHARLES L.
BLACK, Jr., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 76–78 (2d
ed. 1981).
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would limit these outcomes: genuine narrowing, jury sentencing, and “mitigation as a matter of law” sentencing instructions. Not only are these requirements consistent with the
Eighth Amendment, but I also argue that they are critical to
avoiding cruel and unusual outcomes. While such solutions
may be perceived as legitimating by those favoring abolition,
the three proposed reforms seek to minimize harm in states
where abolition is rejected. And while the Court’s decision in
Jones does not mandate the reforms, it explicitly does not forbid them: “[O]ur holding today does not preclude the States
from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving
defendants under 18 convicted of murder.”218 Critically, these
three proposed reforms will also work together to fulfill Miller’s
substantive mandate that life without parole sentences for children be rare.219
While several of my recommendations borrow from death
penalty sentencing procedure, I am not arguing for a mere
replication. In the capital context, many of these protections
have failed to function as intended. In a previous work, I argued that Supreme Court jurisprudence has watered down
protective measures like the individualized sentencing requirement by failing to require sentencing guidelines and thereby
maximizing the discretion of disproportionately white capital
juries.220 Scholars have written convincingly that other capital
sentencing procedural protections have similarly been diluted
in practice.221 Consequently, arbitrary and racially discrimi218
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1323 (2021). Justice Kavanaugh
went on to specify, “States may categorically prohibit life without parole for all
offenders under 18. Or States may require sentencers to make extra factual
findings before sentencing an offender under 18 to life without parole. Or States
may direct sentencers to formally explain on the record why a life-without-parole
sentence is appropriate notwithstanding the defendant’s youth. States may also
establish rigorous proportionality or other substantive appellate review of lifewithout-parole sentences. All of those options, and others, remain available to the
States.” Id.
219
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
220
See Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 837 (“[C]ommon practices that result in disproportionately white juries have limited the efficacy of the
individualized sentencing requirement.”).
221
See, e.g., John Mills, How to Assess the Real World Application of A Capital
Sentencing Statute: A Response to Professor Flanders’s Comment, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. ONLINE 77, 91–92 (2017) (arguing that the Arizona capital sentencing statute
did not represent genuine narrowing because both the number and broad applicability of aggravators rendered nearly every first degree murder death-eligible);
Steiker & Steiker, ALI Report, supra note 185, at 395 (discussing that the efficacy
of the narrowing requirement has been limited by “aggravator creep,” the proliferation of aggravators to the point where most murders become eligible for a death
sentence); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still)
Different?, 11 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 37, 50 (“The requirement of guided discretion,
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natory outcomes remain the norm in capital sentencing.222 I
therefore distinguish each proposed solution from its death
penalty analog to explain how similar failures may be avoided.
Importantly, to be most effective, I argue that all three requirements must be implemented together. Each requirement
fills a gap left by the one that precedes it. Thus, picking and
choosing among the requirements will likely result in an inadequate solution.
A. Ending Life Without Parole for Children
The only surefire way to eliminate racial bias and arbitrariness in Miller sentencing is for states to also eliminate life without parole for children. Regardless of the procedural
protections enacted, individualized sentencing will always allow for sentencer discretion, requiring subjectivity and permitting bias to infect the process—a reality I explored in a previous
work on capital sentencing.223 Moreover, both judges and juries continue to be disproportionately white and middle class,
though it was the first pillar of the Court’s Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence and though it represents the primary concern that led to the constitutional
regulation of capital punishment in the first place, has turned out to be a relatively undemanding constraint. The guidance provided by the new generation of
‘guided discretion’ capital statutes has turned out be minimal in light of the
proliferation of aggravating factors promulgated by state legislatures, the breadth
with which they have been interpreted, and the open-ended quality of individualized mitigation.”); Panel One—The Capital Crime, 80 IND. L.J. 35, 35 (2005) (remarks by Edwin Colfax discussing how aggravator creep prevented the Illinois
statute from achieving the genuine narrowing that would reduce arbitrariness);
William W. Berry III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. REV. 687, 699–709
(2012) (arguing that states have not robustly applied the narrowing requirement
and appellate review to eliminate arbitrariness); Jonathan Simon & Christina
Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated
Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
CULTURE 81–83 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) (discussing the rapid increase of statutory
aggravators).
222
See, e.g., Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 837–40 (“The
identity of those chosen to live and those chosen to die has not changed substantially in the post-Furman era. In the past forty years, capital punishment has
consistently exhibited arbitrary and racist outcomes.”); Berry, Practicing Proportionality, supra note 221, at 700 (“More than ever, commentators recognize that
there is no way to distinguish defendants who receive the death penalty from
those who do not.”); Steiker & Steiker, ALI Report, supra note 185, at 369 (“An
abundant literature . . . reveals the continuing influence of arbitrary factors (such
as geography and quality of representation) and invidious factors (most prominently race) on the distribution of capital verdicts.”).
223
See Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 837 (discussing how
individualized sentencing has resulted in arbitrary and racially discriminatory
outcomes in the capital sentencing arena).
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increasing the risk of anti-Blackness in sentencing.224 Black
children are especially at risk of disproportionate sentencing,
as studies indicate they are more likely to be incorrectly perceived as older and more culpable than their white peers.225
Elimination as a solution is not farfetched. Prior to Miller,
45 states permitted children to be sentenced to life without
parole.226 The trend following Miller has been a movement
away from these sentences. Half of the states currently ban the
sentence for children, and another nine, while theoretically
permitting it, have no one serving these sentences.227 Although the bulk of the states abolished life without parole for
children shortly after Miller, the trend has steadily continued,
with Ohio and Maryland banning these sentences as recently
as 2021.228
State legislatures have not been the only bodies to abolish
life without parole for children. In 2018, the Washington Supreme Court invalidated life without parole punishment for
children because it constituted cruel punishment under the
state’s constitution.229 William Berry has argued that other
states might follow suit, as many state analogs contain broader
224
See Bowers, Steiner & Sandys, Death Sentencing, supra note 174, at 220
(finding that white jurors believe Black defendants are more likely to be dangerous
than white ones, while Black jurors believe that any defendant who kills a Black
victim is more likely to be dangerous); Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich & Guthrie,
supra note 184, at 1222 (discussing 2009 study finding anti-Black bias in white
judges).
225
See Goff, Jackson, Di Leone, Culotta & DiTomasso, supra note 175, at 540
(2014) (“Black boys can be misperceived as older than they actually are and
prematurely perceived as responsible for their actions during a developmental
period where their peers receive the beneficial assumption of childlike innocence.”); see also John Paul Wilson, Kurt Hugenberg & Nicholas O. Rule, Racial
Bias in Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 59, 77 (2017) (finding young Black men more likely to
be perceived as larger and more capable of causing harm than their white
counterparts).
226
CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, NATIONAL TRENDS IN SENTENCING
CHILDREN TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 3 (Feb. 2021), https://cfsy.org/wp-content/
uploads/CFSY-National-Trends-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7YX-5GCD].
227
Rovner, supra note 216, at 1. While Texas, North Dakota, and South
Dakota have eliminated life without parole as an option for defendants going
forward, they do have individuals currently serving life without parole for crimes
committed as juveniles. Id. at 2.
228
Daniel Nichanian, Ohio Will No Longer Sentence Kids to Life Without Parole,
THE APPEAL (Jan. 13, 2021), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/ohio-ends-juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/29GY-X3DQ]; Elizabeth Weil
Greenberg, Maryland Bans Sentencing Children to Life Without Parole, THE APPEAL
(Apr. 13, 2021), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/maryland-bans-sentencing-children-to-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/CYC6-WM7C].
229
State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 346 (Wash. 2018).
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language than the Eighth Amendment.230 Moreover, should
the trend to outlaw these sentences continue, it is possible that
a future Supreme Court could entertain an argument that their
rarity indicates a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s evolving
standards of decency.231
B. Rejecting Permanent Incorrigibility
For states committed to retaining life without parole, the
desire to minimize the kind of blatantly unfair sentencing outcomes that compromise confidence in their criminal legal systems may motivate them to consider reforms. To many, the
most obvious corrective to Jones would be to urge states to
adopt a permanent incorrigibility standard for imposing life
without parole on children. I do not make this recommendation because, while such a standard would undoubtedly benefit
some individuals, it would do little to cure the problem of arbitrary and racially discriminatory sentencing going forward.
A permanent incorrigibility requirement would be most
beneficial for defendants like Brett Jones,232 who were originally sentenced to mandatory life without parole decades earlier, but later sought re-sentencing under Miller. Jones, like
many of his brethren, had spent the intervening years actively
engaged in rehabilitation.233 Despite limited opportunities for
those sentenced to life without parole, Jones earned his GED,
became a reliable prison employee, undertook religious study,
and made unprompted expressions of remorse.234 Consequently, defendants like Jones are best positioned to provide
concrete evidence of reform that prove they are not permanently incorrigible.
However, the standard becomes problematic in initial sentencing hearings where it serves as a predictor for the future
behavior of child defendants. Because only a short time has
elapsed between crime, conviction, and sentence, these defendants have not had time to accumulate evidence of their reform,
230
William W. Berry III, Cruel State Punishments, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1201, 1206
(2020).
231
Berry, supra note 158, at 26.
232
Brett Jones was originally sentenced to mandatory life without parole in
2005 for a crime committed in 2004. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Consider
When Juveniles May Get Life Without Parole, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/us/politics/supreme-court-teenagers-life-sentence.html [https://perma.cc/JS3Z-DLE4].
233
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1339 (2021) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
234
Id.
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leaving it up to sentencers to determine who they might one
day become as adults. In these circumstances, critics across a
wide array of political perspectives have suggested that the
standard is unworkable to the point of being antithetical to the
human condition. Justice Alito has wondered aloud whether
there are any human beings incapable of redemption,235 while
Rachel Lopez, Kempis Songster, and Terrell Carter—the latter
two having themselves received sentences of life without parole—have argued that “all humans have the inner capacity to
forgive and be forgiven, to transform and be transformed,
and . . . the law should reflect these innate qualities.”236
Philosophy aside, there is no evidence to suggest that the
future criminal behavior of children may be accurately predicted.237 Empirical studies have repeatedly found the presence of the same risk factors in children who grew into lawabiding adults as in those who later engaged in violent behavior.238 Not only are such predictions inaccurate, but they also
235

See Transcript of Jones Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 16.
Terrell Carter, Rachel López & Kempis Songster, Redeeming Justice, 116
NW. U. L. REV. 315, 318 (2021).
237
See, e.g., Mary Marshall, Note, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1633, 1657 (2019) (“All the limitations of predicting
future dangerousness in adults become more pronounced when making predictions about whether a juvenile is capable of rehabilitation. There is substantial
evidence to suggest that such predictions are impossible.”); Kimberly Larson,
Frank DiCataldo & Robert Kinscherff, Miller v. Alabama: Implications for Forensic
Mental Health Assessment at the Intersection of Social Science and the Law, 39
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 319, 335–36 (2013) (“[T]here is currently
no basis in current behavioral science nor well-informed professional knowledge
that can support any reliable forensic expert opinion on the relative likelihood of a
specific adolescent’s prospects for rehabilitation at a date that may be years to
decades in the future.”); Alex R. Piquero, Youth Matters: The Meaning of Miller for
Theory, Research, and Policy Regarding Developmental/Life-Course Criminology,
39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 355 (2013) (“[I]t is very difficult to
predict early in the life-course which individual juvenile offender will go on to
become a recidivistic adult offender.”); Elizabeth Scott, Thomas Grisso, Marsha
Levick & Laurence Steinberg, Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional
Framework, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 675, 684 (2016) (“[P]rediction of future violence from
adolescent criminal behavior, even serious criminal behavior, is unreliable and
prone to error.”).
238
See, e.g., JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT
LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70, at 276, 289–90 (2003) (study observing 500
American men from childhood to age seventy that found future criminal behavior
difficult to predict despite isolating risk factors); Rolf Loeber et al., Findings from
the Pittsburgh Youth Study: Cognitive Impulsivity and Intelligence as Predictors of
the Age-Crime Curve, 51 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1136, 1146
(2012) (finding study of Pittsburgh youth unsuccessful at predicting who would
continue to offend into adulthood); see also Lila Kazemian, David P. Farrington &
Marc Le Blanc, Can We Make Accurate Long-Term Predictions About Patterns of
De-Escalation in Offending Behavior?, 38 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 384, 397 (2009)
(noting that while the study predicted short-term behavior change, it did not
236
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tend to result in false positives, overpredicting future
criminality.239
Because the factors determining adult criminality in
juveniles are difficult, if not impossible, to identify, a permanent incorrigibility standard provides little guidance for
sentencers. With this standard, sentencer discretion remains
effectively unchanneled, allowing decision makers to rely on
intuition, including personal prejudices and biases.240
In these ways, a permanent incorrigibility standard resembles the notorious “future dangerousness” aggravator that
exists in capital cases.241 Future dangerousness, or the determination that an adult defendant is likely to be engaged in
future violent behavior, is used as a basis to sentence these
defendants to death in many states.242 Scholars and courts
alike have consistently criticized the standard as inaccurate,243
indicate an ability to predict changes in offending behavior within individuals over
long periods of time).
239
See Laub & Sampson, supra note 238, at 290 (discussing “the false positive
problem,” where prediction scales substantially overpredict future criminality”);
Loeber et al., supra note 238, at 1139 (revealing a high false positive error rate for
their study).
240
See supra notes 168, 170 and accompanying text.
241
I am not the first to make this comparison. An excellent student note has
addressed the topic. See Marshall, supra note 237, at 1654–57, 1662–63.
242
The Texas capital sentencing scheme requires a finding of future dangerousness before death may be imposed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071,
§ (2)(b)(1) (2021). Future dangerousness is a statutory aggravating factor in
Idaho, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(9)(i) (2021); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 701.12.7 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2021). Many additional statutes permit consideration of future dangerousness as a non-statutory
aggravating factor or in rebuttal of the defendant’s mitigating factors. See William
W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto Abolition of
the Death Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 898-900 & nn.58–73 (2010) (listing states
that allow consideration of future dangerousness as a non-statutory aggravating
factor or to rebut defense mitigation) [hereinafter Berry, Dangerousness].
243
See, e.g., Carla Edmondson, Nothing Is Certain but Death: Why Future
Dangerousness Mandates Abolition of the Death Penalty, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
857, 895–910 (2016) (discussing studies indicating a failure to accurately predict
defendants’ future dangerousness); Thomas J. Reidy, Jon R. Sorensen & Mark D.
Cunningham, Probability of Criminal Acts of Violence: A Test of Jury Predictive
Accuracy, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 286, 299 (2013) (“[J]uries were right 90% of the time
when predicting that future violence was not likely, and wrong 90% of the time
when they predicted that future violence was likely.”); Adam Lamparello, Using
Cognitive Neuroscience to Predict Future Dangerousness, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 481, 488 (2011) (“[T]he courts—and commentators—have consistently recognized that predictive adjudications, whether it be for future dangerousness or lack
of control, are often unreliable or . . . simply inaccurate.”); TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, DEADLY SPECULATION: MISLEADING TEXAS CAPITAL JURIES WITH FALSE PREDICTIONS
OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 23 (2004), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/
publications/tx_defender_service_subj_deadly_speculation_misleading_tx_capital_juries_with_false_predictions_of_future_dangerousness.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9JVR-S4PL] (finding that expert predictions of future dangerousness
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speculative,244 and racially discriminatory.245 For years—as
vividly illustrated in Buck v. Davis, where an expert witness
testified Duane Buck was more likely to re-offend in the future
because he was Black246—Texas courts actively encouraged
jurors to consider a defendant’s race in these determinations.247 While testimony of this type is no longer permitted,
these associations persist in the racially coded language of
some prosecutors’ closing arguments.248
Consequently, while the permanent incorrigibility standard did present an opportunity to fetter judges’ discretion in a
way that would be meaningful to defendants seeking re-sentencing under Miller, it allows for too much subjectivity and
bias to serve as a model standard for child defendants appearing for initial sentencing hearings. Accordingly, it is unlikely to
reduce arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes going
forward.
were wrong 95% of the time with respect to 155 Texas capital defendants); Erica
Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testimony
and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 362–63 (2003) (arguing
that predictions about future dangerousness were too unreliable to be used in
court).
244
See, e.g., Berry, Dangerousness, supra note 242, at 907–08
(“[I]ncontrovertible scientific evidence demonstrates that future dangerousness
determinations are, at best, wildly speculative.”).
245
See, e.g., Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of
Narrative to Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV.
305, 327–28 (2012) (discussing how data from the Capital Jury Project reveals
racial bias in future dangerousness assessments); TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, supra
note 243, at 42 (arguing that the juror’s race and the defendant’s race have an
“undeniable effect on determinations of future dangerousness”); Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Racial Disparities in the Capital System: Invidious or Accidental?, 14 CAP.
DEF. J. 305, 317 (2002) (“[A]n African American is more likely to face a jury which
will be more prone to sentence him to death on the future dangerousness predicate out of subconscious fears based on his race.”).
246
137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017) (requiring merits consideration of capital defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to expert
testimony that he was more likely to reoffend in the future because he was Black).
247
Duane Buck’s trial was not the only capital trial where testimony of this
type was permitted. Six additional cases involved similar testimony by the same
expert. Jordan Rudner, Racial Testimony Helped Send Black Man to Texas’ Death
Row; Will Supreme Court Let Him Appeal?, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2016/10/04/racial-testimonyhelped-send-black-man-to-texas-death-row-will-supreme-court-let-him-appeal/
[https://perma.cc/8B9M-YQNC]; see also TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF
DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 59–60 (2000), https://
www.texasdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/TDS-2001-State-of-Denial.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW3B-K6QP] (discussing these seven cases as well as
instances where prosecutors were permitted to rely on racially coded language in
closing argument to encourage findings of future dangerousness) [hereinafter TEX.
DEF. SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL].
248
See, e.g., TEX. DEF. SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL, supra note 247, at 59–60.
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C. Narrowing Requirement
This Article recommends three procedural reforms—particularly when enacted together—that can have a meaningful
impact on arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes. A
“genuine narrowing” requirement will fulfill Miller’s mandate
that sentences of life without parole be uncommon for child
defendants, while reducing arbitrariness by increasing the predictability of these outcomes. Jury sentencing will reduce racially discriminatory outcomes for eligible defendants. A
“mitigation as a matter of law” instruction will accomplish both
aims by channeling juror discretion to reflect the principles of
Miller, while guarding against the cognitive errors that may
result from racial bias.
As Miller required individualized sentencing for children
facing life without parole, the most obvious place for states to
begin is with its counterbalance: an offense-based narrowing
requirement. Currently, any homicide crime is theoretically
eligible for a life without parole sentence from a constitutional
standpoint.249 A narrowing requirement would force states to
limit eligibility by identifying a subset of homicide crimes that
constitute the “worst of the worst”—crimes severe enough to
satisfy the penological justifications of lifelong incapacitation
and retribution. As with capital crimes, this could theoretically
be satisfied in two ways. First, states could narrow at the
charging point by limiting the types of first-degree murder that
qualify for a life without parole sentence when applied to children. Alternatively, states could require the sentencer to find
evidence of certain statutorily enumerated aggravating factors
following a defendant’s conviction for the defendant to be eligible for life without parole.
With either method, it is imperative that states avoid the
pitfalls of capital sentencing by engaging in narrowing that is
also genuine in practice. Most scholars consider the narrowing
requirement to have failed in the capital context for two reasons. First, in a phenomenon known as “aggravator creep,” the
number of statutory aggravators has grown significantly over
time across states.250 Aggravator creep refers to the tendency
249
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012). But see id. at 490–93
(Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting Graham prohibited life without parole as a
sentence for any child who did not intend to kill the victim).
250
Mills, supra note 221, at 91–92 (arguing that the Arizona capital sentencing statute did not represent genuine narrowing because both the number and
broad applicability of aggravators rendered nearly every first degree murder
death-eligible); Steiker & Steiker, ALI Report, supra note 185, at 395 (noting that
the efficacy of the narrowing requirement has been limited by aggravator creep);
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of state legislatures to enact more and more aggravators over
time, typically because doing so has proved politically popular.251 In a vivid example, following Furman, the state of Arizona originally enacted a capital statute based on the Model
Penal Code that included six aggravating circumstances.252
Over time, the Arizona statute grew to include 14 aggravators,
including broad categories such as committing the offense “in
an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner” and committing the offense in a “cold, calculated manner without pretense
of remorse or moral justification.”253 The Arizona statute left
one commentator to wonder “whether any first-degree murder
would be excluded.”254 Indeed, a review of 866 first-degree
murder cases in Maricopa County from 2002 to 2012 revealed
that 856, or 98%, were death-eligible.255
The second reason the narrowing requirement has failed in
practice is due to judicial interpretation.256 Following its early
decisions in Godfrey and Maynard, Supreme Court jurisprudence has consistently upheld the constitutionality of broad
aggravators, provided the state applies some sort of “narrowing
construction.”257 These narrowing constructions, which often
employ similarly broad language in their explanation of the
aggravator, need not necessarily be communicated to the sen-

Panel One—The Capital Crime, supra note 221, at 35 (discussing how aggravator
creep prevented the Illinois statute from achieving the genuine narrowing that
would reduce arbitrariness).
251
Mills, supra note 221, at 91–92; Steiker & Steiker, ALI Report, supra note
185, at 395.
252
Mills, supra note 221, at 90–92.
253
Id. (citing a previous version of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-751(F)).
254
Id. at 91.
255
See Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1056 (2018) (discussing review of
Maricopa County murder cases in a statement by Justices Breyer respecting the
Court’s decision to deny certiorari in a case challenging whether the Arizona
capital statute violated the narrowing requirement).
256
Steiker & Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Different?, supra note
221, at 50.
257
See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 459 (2005) (upholding a death sentence despite resting on “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravator);
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 468, 479 (1993) (finding that asking the jury to
evaluate whether the defendant behaved as a “cold-blooded, pitiless slayer” rendered the otherwise vague aggravating factor regarding “utter disregard for
human life” constitutional); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653–54 (1990) (upholding a death sentence resting on “especially heinous, cruel, and depraved”
aggravator), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);
Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (finding Arizona’s “especially heinous,
cruel, and depraved” aggravator constitutional as applied).
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tencer to pass constitutional muster.258 For example, in Bell v.
Cone, the Court affirmed a death sentence that rested on the
especially “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator because the
Tennessee Supreme Court had employed a narrowing construction on review, interpreting the aggravator to involve a
“conscienceless or pitiless crime which [was] unnecessarily torturous to the victim.”259
Moreover, the failure of the narrowing requirement in the
capital context has not happened in a vacuum. It coincided
with a similar watering down of the individualized sentencing
provision, as I detailed in a previous work.260 Since Woodson,
the Court has interpreted individualized sentencing more and
more expansively, maximizing juror discretion to consider—
but also to disregard—mitigation evidence.261 Without clear
guidelines that particular evidence should be viewed favorably,
white jurors frequently hold mitigating evidence against criminal defendants, particularly Black defendants or those whose
victims are white.262
Just because narrowing in the capital context has failed
does not mean it must in the Miller context. First, even a modest effort to cabin eligibility would be an improvement on the
current situation, where states are free to make any homicide
crime eligible for life without parole. At minimum, felony murder and other forms of murder lacking specific intent should
not meet the bar for a life without parole sentence, as Justice
Breyer’s concurrence in Miller specified.263 These crimes meet
Graham’s criteria of “twice diminished culpability” because
they involved children who did not kill or intend to kill.264
In addition, states should enact narrowing based on offender attributes. For example, states should authorize an age
eligibility threshold categorically banning children below a particular age. Some evidence suggests that 15-years-old would
be an appropriate cut-off.265 This was the initial ask in Miller,
as the parties argued whether a categorical ban was required
for children 14-years-old and younger, but the Court punted
258
See, e.g., Bell, 543 U.S. at 459 (affirming a death sentence where narrowing
construction was deployed on review but not communicated to the sentencing
jury).
259
Id. at 458–59.
260
Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 837
261
Id. at 837, 844–48.
262
Id. at 847–48 (discussing studies showing this result).
263
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 490–93 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
264
Id. at 490; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010).
265
Brief for Petitioner at 12–26, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No.
10-9646), 2012 WL 92505.
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on the question.266 Life without parole sentences for this age
group were already rare, even under the mandatory regime,
indicating a moral reluctance to impose the punishment.267
Research shows that this is the age where susceptibility to peer
pressure is at its peak.268 Because cognitive gains begin to
slow around age 16, 14-year-olds tend to perform significantly
worse on cognitive tests than older teens.269
While enacting these limitations might modestly reduce the
class of children eligible for life without parole and prevent
some unusual sentences, more extreme narrowing is necessary
to meet Miller’s substantive mandate that these sentences be
uncommon. As such, states should limit life without parole
sentences for children to only the most aggravated murders.
Evidence in the capital context suggests that these cases are
the least likely to fall prey to racial bias. An empirical study of
capital cases in Georgia revealed that, for “certain categories of
extremely serious [homicides],” juries imposed death consistently regardless of the race of the defendant or victim.270 The
results of this study prompted Justice Stevens to observe, “If
Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to
those categories, the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory
266
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (“We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders. . . . Because that holding is sufficient to decide these
cases, we do not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles,
or at least for those 14 and younger.”).
267
Between 1971 and 2012, when Miller was decided, approximately 79 individuals aged 14 or younger received sentences of life without parole. Brief for
Petitioner, Miller, supra note 265, at 24. Of these, only eight received their
sentences in discretionary regimes. Id.
268
Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 16, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (No. 10-9646), 2012 WL
174239 (citing ELIZABETH SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 38 (2008); Thomas Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers
and Parents, 15 DEV. PSYCH. 608, 612, 615–616 (1979); Laurence Steinberg &
Susan Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early Adolescence, 57 CHILD.
DEV. 841, 848 (1986)).
269
Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison
of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
333, 343–44 (2003) (16- to 17-year-olds did not differ from 18- to 24-year-old
adults but performed significantly better than 14- to 15-year-olds on tests of basic
cognitive abilities); Daniel Keating, Cognitive and Brain Development, in HANDBOOK
OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 45, 64 (Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds.,
2d ed. 2004) (cognitive functions exhibit robust growth at earlier ages but approach a limit in the 14- to 16-year-old group).
270
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the “Baldus study,” an empirical analysis of 2,484 Georgia homicide
cases conducted by David Baldus, George Woodworth, and Charles Pulaski).
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imposition of the death penalty would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated.”271
The way to codify “certain categories of extremely serious
homicides” would be first to define a list of aggravating circumstances that enhance the seriousness of the crime and then to
require that a certain number of these circumstances exist in
order to render the homicide eligible for life without parole. To
avoid the pitfalls of the capital context, states should avoid
highly subjective aggravators that describe a crime as “heinous” or “outrageous.” Instead, aggravators should describe
factual circumstances related to well-defined categories, such
as the number of victims, the identity of the victims, or the
existence of concurrently committed felonies or injuries inflicted prior to death. To isolate the most serious homicides,
states should require a finding that multiple aggravators exist
before a homicide becomes death-eligible.
In isolation, even extreme narrowing will not eliminate arbitrariness for the simple reason that it would not affect sentencer discretion with respect to individualized sentencing.
But it would significantly shrink the size of this class of defendants eligible for life without parole, making those impacted by
individualized sentencing only the tip of Justice Stevens’s metaphorical pyramid. It would also decrease the variability
caused by prosecutorial discretion, as prosecutors in the same
state would have the same factual constraints on whom they
could charge with a life without parole eligible crime. In these
ways, extreme narrowing would create procedural backing for
Miller’s substantive mandate that these sentences be
uncommon.
Renowned death penalty scholars Carol and Jordan
Steiker have predicted—to date, correctly, given Jones—that
the Court is unlikely to constitutionally mandate narrowing in
the Miller context and have posited that a constitutional mandate is undesirable.272 Chiefly, the Steikers attributed the failure of narrowing to curb arbitrary and racially discriminatory
death sentences to many of the reasons discussed above.273
But, of course, narrowing in practice has strayed from the
“genuine narrowing” proposed in Furman that I am advocating
for now. The Steikers also addressed two other obstacles.
First, they posited that underlying policy concerns regarding
271

Id.
Steiker & Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Different?, supra note
221, at 49–50.
273
Id. at 50.
272
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unfair sentencing outcomes are less applicable to judges, who
currently impose Miller sentences, than to the juries responsible for death sentences.274 They described judges’ “professional norms and repeat-player status” as perceived bulwarks
against arbitrary sentences and argued that the persistence of
judicial sentencing in most states “reflects . . . faith in judicial
judgment.”275 Whether or not these observations reflect conventional wisdom is debatable, but as I detailed in Part III,
judges have the same implicit biases as jurors, and the bench
skews at least as white and male as juries do.276 Moreover,
judicial sentencing is typically determined by an individual,
while jury sentencing requires collaboration, increasing the
odds that diverse voices will influence the outcome.
Second, the Steikers warned that narrowing could have
significant procedural implications. Specifically, a narrowing
requirement is likely to implicate “the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury determination of all sentencing facts that function as
elements of an offense” by increasing the penalty of the
crime.277 In a line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New
Jersey,278 the Court invalidated sentences imposed by judges
conditioned on factual aggravation that only the judge themselves had ever found to exist: first, in the state sentencing

274

Id. at 49.
Id.
276
See supra notes 184–194 and accompanying text (discussing implicit biases of judges and the effect of these biases on sentencing).
277
Steiker & Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Different?, supra note
221, at 49–50. However, the administrability costs of this constitutional requirement could be sidestepped simply by performing narrowing on the front end via
the charging statute. If states chose to implement narrowing by relegating life
without parole as punishment for homicides involving a limited set of specific
factual scenarios, these facts would necessarily be built into the criminal trial. In
deciding innocence or guilt, the jury would necessarily also determine, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the absence or existence of these qualifying facts. Sentencing
for those convicted of qualifying crimes could still constitutionally be determined
by judges, instead of requiring an additional jury sentencing proceeding. It is only
in the scenario where states perform narrowing on the back end that the Sixth
Amendment comes into play. In these cases, states determine general categories
of homicides eligible for life without parole and then, following a defendant’s
conviction, require an additional finding of aggravating circumstances for a sentence of life without parole. Here, because the finding of aggravating circumstances increases the penalty for the crime, the Sixth Amendment would likely
require an additional jury determination, functionally resulting in jury sentencing
in Miller cases.
278
530 U.S. 466, 469, 497 (2000); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 308 (2004) (applying Apprendi to state court plea bargains).
275
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context279 and, later, in the federal sentencing280 and death
penalty contexts.281 Ring v. Arizona held that defendants had a
right to the jury determination of aggravating circumstances
before a death sentence could be constitutionally imposed because “the required finding of an aggravated circumstance exposed Ring to a greater punishment than that authorized by
the jury’s guilty verdict.”282
The Steikers were likely right about the current Court’s
reluctance to implicate Sixth Amendment jury sentencing in
the Miller context. The specter of Apprendi was present during
the oral arguments in both Malvo and Jones, as several judges
pushed attorneys to concede that constitutionally mandating a
factual finding of permanent incorrigibility would necessarily
also constitutionally mandate that this finding be performed by
a jury.283 Justice Kavanaugh incorporated this possibility into
the Jones opening, noting in a footnote that “[i]f permanent
incorrigibility were a factual prerequisite to a life-without-parole sentence, this Court’s Sixth Amendment precedents might
require that a jury, not a judge, make such a finding. If we
were to rule for Jones here, the next wave of litigation would
likely concern the scope of the jury right.”284 Although I argue
that the permanent incorrigibility standard would have functioned as a narrowing requirement, it is certainly more modest
and more ephemeral than my proposal of enumerated aggravating circumstances that genuinely narrow. That said, as I
detail below, I view jury sentencing as a positive good, even if
the Court is reluctant to impose it.
While the Steikers may be correct about the Court’s unwillingness to impose narrowing, they failed to address the role
that state legislation could play in implementing change irrespective of a constitutional mandate. States seeking to avoid
arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes have no constitutional impediment in choosing to enact a narrowing require279

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491–92; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (applying Apprendi
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Alleyene v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103
(2013) (finding that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact triggering
a mandatory minimum sentence).
281
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 94 (2016); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589
(2002).
282
Ring, 536 U.S. at 604 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494) (alterations
adopted).
283
Transcript of Malvo Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 49–53 (questioning
by Justice Gorsuch); Transcript of Jones Oral Argument, supra note 147, at
61–63 (exchange with Justice Kavanaugh).
284
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 n.3 (2021) (citations omitted).
280
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ment. As Justice Kavanaugh emphasized in Jones, states are
free to experiment with additional sentencing requirements in
the Miller context.285 Indeed, those seeking to avoid future
federal and state litigation based on such outcomes have an
incentive to do so.
D. Jury Sentencing
Along with a genuine narrowing requirement, states that
want to minimize racially discriminatory outcomes should
adopt jury sentencing for children eligible for life without parole.286 Moreover, states may adopt this reform without a fear
that doing so will increase arbitrary outcomes, provided they
equip jurors with the same knowledge and guidelines as they
do judges. Indeed, because jury sentencing will likely result in
a more robust presentation of relevant evidence by opposing
counsel, its corresponding administrative costs will discourage
prosecutors from seeking life without parole sentences for all
but the “worst” defendants.
Juries have the potential to be less racially discriminatory
than judges in their sentencing determinations. As discussed
above, judges fall prey to the same implicit biases as nonjudges, and the bench as a whole tends to be less racially
diverse than juries which, at least in theory, represent a crosssection of the community.287 There is some evidence that white
judges might even be more likely to suffer from anti-Black bias.
A study published in 2009 involving judges from three jurisdictions concluded that “[t]he proportion of white judges in our
study who revealed automatic associations of white with good
and black with bad was, if anything, slightly higher than the
proportion found in the online surveys of white Americans.”288
The authors also found that judges tended to overestimate
their ability to set aside their biases. When asked to rate their
own ability to “avoid racial prejudice in decisionmaking” as
compared to other judges attending the same conference, 97%
placed themselves in the top half, and 50% placed themselves
285

Id. at 1323.
Because the studies on noncapital jury sentencing are limited and more
research is desirable, states should also permit defendants to waive jury sentencing without requiring prosecutorial approval, should the defendant prefer judicial
sentencing. See Guha Krishnamurthi, The Constitutional Right to Bench Trial,
100 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author).
287
See supra notes 184–194 and accompanying text.
288
Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich & Guthrie, supra note 184, at 1222.
286
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in the top 25%, resulting in numbers that are unlikely to be
true.289
Long thought of as a virtue, the repeat-player status of
judicial sentencers can also be a hindrance when it comes to
avoiding implicit bias. Studies have found that intuitive responses—as contrasted with careful, reason-based decisions—
can result from “repetition of the same deliberative procedure.”290 Intuition provides an avenue for unconscious racial,
gender, and attractiveness bias to seep into the decision-making process.291
This is not to say that juries cannot also engage in racially
discriminatory decision-making. Individual jurors are subject
to the same implicit biases as judges. And although the Constitution seemingly requires that juries represent a fair crosssection of the community, many scholars have pointed out that
this ideal is rarely realized.292 Jury pools drawn from voter
registration rolls disproportionately exclude Black and Brown
potential jurors, as do laws temporarily or permanently disqualifying individuals with felony convictions from jury service.293 In part because of the inefficacy of Batson v. Kentucky,
prosecutors continue to use peremptory strikes to remove
Black and Brown jurors at a higher rate.294 The race-based
preferences of capital juries are also well documented; copious
studies indicate that these juries are more likely to impose
289

Id. at 1225–26.
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 170, at 8 (finding intuitive
decisions more error prone).
291
Id. at 31.
292
See, e.g., Alexis Hoag, An Unbroken Thread: African American Exclusion
from Jury Service, Past and Present, 81 LA. L. REV. 55, 56 n.1 (2020) (quoting Nina
W. Chernoff, Black to the Future: The State Action Doctrine and the White Jury, 58
WASHBURN L.J. 103, 103 (2019) (“There is a significant amount of evidence, however, that jury pools do not reflect a fair cross-section of their communities, in that
they underrepresent African-Americans and Latinos.”)).
293
See, e.g., id. at 73 (observing that when voter eligibility determines juror
eligibility and individuals with felony convictions are excluded from voter registrations, African Americans and Latinx people are most likely to be excluded from
juries); James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There
Empirical Support for Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service?, 36 LAW &
POL’Y 1, 3 (2014) (noting that “[f]elon jury exclusion statutes . . . presume that
convicted felons pose a unique threat to the jury process” and that “[n]o other
group of prospective jurors is categorically excluded from the jury pool because of
an alleged pretrial bias”).
294
476 U.S. 79, 89, 96–97 (1986) (ruling that a prosecutor cannot “challenge
potential jurors solely on account of their race” and creating a burden-shifting
framework for challenging a juror’s dismissal based on their race); see Miller,
Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 845–46 (discussing failure of Batson v.
Kentucky and corresponding scholarship).
290
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death when the victim is white, the defendant is Black, or
both.295
Noncapital juries are likely more diverse than their capital
counterparts because they are not subject to death qualification—the process of excluding potential jurors who state that
their opposition to capital punishment would prevent them
from imposing a death sentence under any circumstances.
Death qualification disproportionately removes Black people
and women of all races from capital juries296 because they are
more likely to oppose the death penalty.297 Although more research is needed, there is some evidence that race of the defendant or the victim is less influential in noncapital jury
sentencing. The study of noncapital jury sentences in Virginia
and Arkansas revealed an association between race and sentence lengths in only three categories of crime in Virginia and
none in Arkansas, leading its author to conclude that “race
may play less of a role in non-capital sentencing than it does in
capital sentencing.”298
In essence, jury sentencing guarantees a determination
made by multiple individuals of varying backgrounds and biases, while judicial sentencing rests on a single decision
maker. This truism has prompted scholars to suggest that “a
diversely composed jury” is “[p]erhaps the only entity in the
295

Ross Kleinstuber, McCleskey and the Lingering Problem of “Race”, in RACE
DEATH PENALTY: THE LEGACY OF McCleskey v. Kemp 37, 38 (David P. Keys &
R.J. Maratea eds., 2016) (indicating that 32 of 36 empirical studies on racial
discrimination in capital punishment found this outcome).
296
See Ann M. Eisenberg, Removal of Women and African Americans in Jury
Selection in South Carolina Capital Cases, 1997–2012, 9 NE. L. REV. 299, 339–45
(2017) (finding that more Black or women jury members were excused for cause
than white jury members due to anti-death penalty views in Lexington County);
Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors: Death Qualification and
Evolving Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113, 118 (2016) (finding in a sample of
prospective jurors in Louisiana “that nearly sixty percent of [those] who were
struck under Witherspoon were African American, and more than one-third of all
the African Americans in the jury venire were struck for cause on the basis of their
opposition to the death penalty”); J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma
in Death Qualification of Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1140–43,
1147–48 (2014) (explaining that “[B]lack jurors expressing reservations about
capital punishment are subject to exclusion through peremptory strikes” which
greatly reduces the number of Black jurors serving on a capital jury); Alec T.
Swafford, Note, Qualified Support: Death Qualification, Equal Protection, and Race,
39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 147, 158 (2011) (asserting that disproportional exclusion of
Black people from capital juries results in impartiality, particularly in cases with
Black defendants).
297
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Death Qualification in Black and White: Racialized Decision Making and Death-Qualified Juries, 40 LAW & POL’Y 148, 152 (2018).
298
Nancy J. King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and NonCapital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 203 (2004).
AND THE
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system that might avoid the influence of the bigot in the
brain.”299 In his article arguing for jury sentencing at large,
Morris B. Hoffman similarly contends that it is likely “more
dangerous to leave the sentencing decision to a single person,
whose membership in a particular group might skew his or her
views considerably, than to leave it to many people, whose
memberships in many groups will force them to accommodate
their inter-strata differences.”300
There is no reason to fear that the cost of jury sentencing
will lead to an increase in arbitrary outcomes. Contrary to
popular belief, there is no conclusive evidence that juries’ sentencing decisions are any more or less arbitrary than those
rendered by judges, although more empirical studies are necessary.301 Despite conventional wisdom that jurors are ruled
by their passions while judges dispassionately apply the law,
existing empirical evidence does not bear this out. Studies on
rates of jury-judge disagreement in criminal trials conducted in
1969, 1994, and 2004 all indicated that in cases where disagreement occurred, jurors were reliably more lenient.302 While
one 1970s study of 1,395 criminal cases in El Paso, Texas,
where defendants could choose between judicial and jury sentencing, did conclude that jury sentences were both “more
harsh and more dispersed” than judicial sentences,303 studies
examining the transitions in Georgia and Alabama from jury to
judicial sentencing showed the opposite.304 A study of judicial
299

Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich, & Guthrie, supra note 184, at 1222.
Hoffman, supra note 191, at 986–87.
301
Id. at 987. Studies involving rates of jury-judge agreement in criminal
cases indicate that judges report that they agree with jury decisions between 73
and 78 percent of the time. See Jennifer K. Robbennolot, Evaluating Juries by
Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469,
476–78 (2005) (summarizing the findings of studies conducted in 1969, 1994,
and 2004). These studies also show that the most disagreement comes in “close”
cases, and that when disagreement exists, jurors tend to be lenient considerably
more often than judges. Id. at 479, Table 1.
302
Robbennolot, supra note 301, at 479, Table 1. An experimental study of
116 Illinois State Court judges, 154 people who had reported for jury duty, and 55
students asked to determine sentences in four hypothetical cases found similar
results. Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 74–75 (1989). While substantial disagreement did not exist in two of the hypothetical cases, lay respondents were more
lenient than judges in the remaining two. Id. at 75–81.
303
Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of
El Paso County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 8–9 (1994). Weninger
acknowledged that some of these results were likely influenced by the judicial
practice of offering a lenient sentence to entice a defendant to forego a jury trial.
Id.
304
See Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1796 n.100 (1999) (discuss300
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and jury sentences in Virginia and Arkansas from 1995 to 2001
found that jury sentencing was more variable, in part because
state laws prevented jurors from accessing judicial sentencing
guidelines.305 A more recent survey of Florida judges revealed
that whether or not a capital defendant was sentenced to death
resembled the odds of a coin flip: 45% of judges given a capital
murder hypothetical voted to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment, while 55% given the same hypothetical voted to
impose death.306 These results suggested that the sentencing
decision came down not to the facts of the crime or the characteristics of the defendant, but to the identity of the individual
sentencer.
Additionally, the administrative costs of jury sentencing
can serve as a backdoor narrowing mechanism by dissuading
prosecutors from seeking sentences of life imprisonment without parole against youthful defendants.307 Jurors require instruction on the law and need time for deliberation, adding to
the lengths of sentencing proceedings, and jury selection increases the risk of reversible error.308 Moreover, empanelment
of jurors typically leads to the presentation of witnesses and a
more robust development of mitigation evidence, as opposed to
ing William A. Eckert & Lauri E. Ekstrand, The Impact of Sentencing Reform: A
Comparison of Judge and Jury Sentencing Systems 8–10 (1975) (unpublished
manuscript)) (“comparing sentences before and after Georgia introduced judge
sentencing and finding no evidence of systematic jury-sentencing disparity in any
of the crime categories studied except aggravated assault”); id. (discussing Brent
L. Smith & Edward H. Stevens, Sentence Disparity and the Judge-Jury Sentencing
Debate: An Analysis of Robbery Sentences in Six Southern States, 9 CRIM. JUST.
REV. 1, 4 (1984)) (“finding a larger deviation from the mean in Alabama in the
period of judge sentencing than in the jury sentencing years, although the standard deviation in all three jury states was higher than in the three judge-sentencing states studied”).
305
Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases:
Comparing Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Two States, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331, 333, 351–57 (2005); see also Jenny Gathright, Jury
Sentencing Reform Brings Virginia ‘Out of the Ice Age,’ Proponents Say, DCIST
(Dec. 17, 2020), https://dcist.com/story/20/12/17/jury-sentencing-reformbrings-virginia-out-ice-age/ [https://perma.cc/X4HG-Y5FM] (discussing Virginia
jury sentencing without sentencing guidelines over the last twenty years).
306
See Brief of Former Florida Circuit Court Judges as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2015) (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL
3623138 (citing Judge O.H. Eaton, Jr., Capital Punishment: A Failed Experiment
(Part 2), 24 FLORIDA DEF. 56, 60 (2012)).
307
See Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553, 612 (2015) (“Moreover, because a sentencing proceeding before a jury is likely to be more timeconsuming and work-intensive for all parties, the right to jury sentencing for
juveniles facing life without parole gives juveniles greater leverage in plea negotiations with prosecutors.”).
308
Id.
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judicial sentencing, which often merely consists of oral argument by the parties.309 In the capital context, the costs of the
sentencing phase have encouraged prosecutors to carefully
scrutinize whether a case is worth pursuing a death sentence.
As a result, more crimes are charged non-capitally, resulting in
an overall decline in death sentences.310 Thus, jury sentencing
is another mechanism to render life without parole sentences
for children uncommon—reserved only for the “worst of the
worst.”
Should states adopt jury sentencing, three possible models
exist. First is the model currently practiced in Rhode Island
and Vermont, which I call the “eligibility model.”311 Here, juries determine a defendant’s eligibility for life without parole,
but the judge imposes the final sentence.312 Second is what I
call the “capital model,” where jurors hear evidence and determine only whether the sentence should be life without parole or
not life without parole. If the jury determines the former, the
sentence is final; if it determines the latter, the judge determines the lesser sentence. This resembles the process that
currently occurs in most capital cases where the jury determines whether death is an appropriate sentence. The capital
model differs from the eligibility model in that the jury’s imposition of life without parole is binding; under the eligibility model,
a judge retains discretion to impose a non-life sentence even
after the jury has found the defendant to be “eligible” for life
without parole. Third is what I call the “noncapital model,”
where the jury is given a sentencing range that includes a
maximum sentence of life without parole, and the jury may
impose a sentence within that range.
Each of these models has drawbacks, but the most desirable one is the noncapital model, provided it comes with some
procedural safeguards. The biggest drawback of the eligibility
model is that, because jurors understand that a judge is imposing the actual sentence in the case, they do not have to feel
responsibility for the outcome.313 Studies in now-amended
capital jurisdictions where the juror’s sentence constituted a
non-binding recommendation demonstrated that jurors were
309
See id. at 611–12. (“With a jury empaneled, judges are likely to allow more
time for the presentation of evidence, and defense lawyers may more readily
recognize the need for a higher level of development of mitigating evidence.”).
310
Steiker & Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Different?, supra note
221, at 46.
311
VT. STAT. ANN tit. 13, § 2303 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19.2-1 (2014).
312
Id.
313
Russell, supra note 307, at 614.
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less likely to take deliberation seriously and less likely to devote
significant time to their sentencing determination.314 The second model fixes this problem to a certain extent by requiring
jurors to take responsibility for imposing life without parole
sentences; however, it relies on judges to affix lesser sentences,
depriving defendants of a decision by a more diverse body. The
third model maximizes jury responsibility and participation,
but is the most likely to lead to arbitrary results within the
range if jurors are not provided with any guidelines to help
make their determination—as is currently the case in jurisdictions that conduct noncapital jury sentencing.315 Scholars
have attributed much of the variance in jury sentencing to the
fact that, without the sentencing guidelines, jurors have unfettered discretion.316 Moreover, noncapital sentencing jurors
lack access to other basic sentencing information that judges
take for granted, such as parole eligibility and rates, the relevance of good time accumulation, and the difference between
concurrent and consecutive sentencing, which is necessary to
limit arbitrary outcomes.317 Consequently, while I believe the
noncapital model of jury sentencing is the best option, states
should not adopt it without a commitment to provide jurors
with the same sentencing guidelines and information available
to judges.

314
See, e.g., William J. Bowers, Wanda D. Foglia, Jean E. Giles & Michael E.
Antonio, The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of the Way the
Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 931, 1010 (2006) (indicating that jurors will fail to feel responsibility
for the defendant’s punishment if the jury’s sentence determination was merely a
recommendation).
315
See King, supra note 298, at 196–98; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101
(2018) (prescribing noncapital jury sentencing without guidelines in Arkansas); 2
ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL AMCI 2D 9102 (2018) (standard
punishment instruction in Arkansas merely states that the offense “is punishable
by imprisonment in the Department of Correction for not less than 6 years and
not more than 30 year, or by a fine not exceeding $15,000 or by both imprisonment and a fine”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2018) (stating in cases “tried by a
jury, the jury shall not be presented any information regarding sentencing guidelines”); 1 WILLIAM S. COOPER & DONALD P. CETRULO, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
§ 12.11 (2018) (only guidance in the penalty phase instructions in Kentucky
states that “[y]ou shall now fix his punishment for that offense at confinement in
the penitentiary for not less than 20 years nor more than 50 years, or for life, in
your discretion”); MO. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2018) (requiring that sentencing juries in Missouri be instructed merely “as to the range of punishment authorized
by statute for each submitted offense”).
316
See King, supra note 298, at 196–98.
317
Id. at 209.
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E. Mitigation as a Matter of Law
While sentencing guidelines are important as a way of
channeling sentencer discretion, they are not sufficient in form
to avoid arbitrary outcomes. More than just being told factors
to “consider,” jurors must be told how to consider the factors in
a manner that is consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, jurors must be told that the existence of certain types
of evidence can only support a more lenient sentence. I previously deemed this concept “mitigation as a matter of law” in a
prior work that explored its application to capital
sentencing.318
Simply labeling types of evidence as “mitigating factors” is
not sufficient to ensure that jurors will give them mitigating
effect. In the capital context, studies have shown that white
jurors, in particular, misinterpret classic mitigation evidence—
such as an impoverished childhood, familial substance abuse,
mental illness, and a positive institutional history—as reasons
to impose death instead of to bestow mercy.319 There is no
reason to think such confusion and/or bias would not appear
in the Miller sentencing context. Sarah French Russell has
predicted as much: “[A]lthough existing studies suggest that
juries are likely to view youth as mitigating, racial bias may
prevent juries from giving youth mitigating effect in some
cases.”320 The Supreme Court found in Roper that a categorical bar of death sentences for young people was necessary in
part because “[i]n some cases a defendant’s youth may even be
counted against him,” citing the prosecutor’s argument that if
the defendant was this violent at a young age, he would likely
worsen as an adult.321
318

See Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 859–63.
See, e.g., Lynch & Haney, supra note 297, at 164 (discussing surveys in
Solano County, California, where 12–13% of white potential jurors stated that
evidence indicating the defendant had a loving family who opposed his execution,
had an impoverished childhood, had been raised by a single disabled parent, had
himself been a good husband and parent, or had adjusted well to incarceration
would have made them more likely to impose a death sentence). The survey found
that whites were especially unreceptive to evidence related to the defendant’s
social history or background. Id.
320
Russell, supra note 307, at 611.
321
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558, 572–73 (2005) (noting that the
prosecutor in Mr. Simmons’s case responded to defense counsel’s argument that
Simmons’s youth was mitigating by stating, “Age, he says. Think about age.
Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that scare you? Mitigating? Quite
the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.”); see also Emens, supra note 92, at
72–81 (discussing the anti-discriminatory reasoning that underlies the bar
against death sentences for juvenile defendants).
319
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In this holding and in additional cases, the Court has made
clear that the characteristics of youth are mitigating as a matter of law. Beginning with Thompson and extending through
Jones, the Court has reaffirmed that the characteristics of
youth result in “diminished culpability” for children.322 The
Thompson Court referred to the “special mitigating force of
youth,”323 while the Roper Court acknowledged that “the case
for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an
adult.”324 In Graham, the Court announced that “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”325 Miller mandated consideration of the “mitigating qualities of youth,” and found that these
qualities decreased the penological justifications for punishment.326 In finding Miller’s holding to be substantive law, the
Montgomery Court concluded that Miller “did more than require
a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without parole; it established that the penological
justifications for life without parole collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’”327 Even Jones, which recast the
holding of Miller to a requirement that youth merely be “considered” before sentencing, acknowledged that “[i]n that process,
the sentencer will consider the murderer’s ‘diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change.’”328
Of course, an instruction that merely informs the sentencer that youthfulness favors leniency is not sufficient. Instead, jurors should be directed that any evidence of the socalled Miller factors—broadly defined as immaturity, vulnerability, and changeability—supports a lesser sentence. More
specifically, these include “age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; difficulties in “the family and
322
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836–37 (1988) (referring to “lesser
culpability of the juvenile offender”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71 (2005); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010) (finding children who did not commit homicides
had “twice diminished moral culpability”); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471
(2012) (explaining that juveniles are less deserving of the most severe punishments because of their diminished culpability and greater capacity for reform);
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 207–08 (2015) (discussing how the Miller
factors require that the sentencing judge consider how children are different,
namely, that they have diminished culpability and greater potential for reform, in
the sentencing decision); Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (2021)
(enumerating and applying the Miller factors).
323
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
324
Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
325
Graham, 560 U.S. at 73 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
326
Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 476 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
327
Montgomery, 567 U.S. at 208.
328
Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1316.
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home environment”; reduced participation in the crime, evidence of peer pressure; “incompetencies associated with
youth,” including difficulties interacting with police or assisting
attorneys; and capacity for rehabilitation.329
A possible sample jury instruction—modeled on one I proposed in the capital context330—could read:
You have heard evidence that [insert specific mitigating circumstance]. If you believe this evidence, you must consider
it as evidence that supports a sentence that is below the
maximum sentence. You may not consider this evidence in
support of a sentence of life without parole.

Such an instruction, written in plain language, would
channel jurors’ discretion by explaining how they should interpret mitigation evidence and how they must factor it into their
sentencing decision. This would limit discretion by mandating
that jurors take into account evidence of the Miller factors and
would reduce racial bias by preventing them from considering
these factors as evidence of aggravation. The result would reduce the likelihood of arbitrary and racially discriminatory sentencing outcomes.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s failure to adopt adequate procedural protections to counteract the unfettered discretion of individualized
sentencing for children faced with life without parole will likely
produce the same sort of arbitrary and racially discriminatory
outcomes that resulted in the invalidation of the death penalty.
States can avoid these results by abolishing life without parole
for children. Short of this, they can enact a trio of procedural
protections that will limit these unfair outcomes. Should they
fail to do so, empirical research demonstrating similar “lightning strikes” in the Miller context has the potential to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of life without parole for children.
Although further research is needed, there is reason to
believe that the same sort of arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes occurs in the cases of children sentenced to
constructive life without parole331 and in those of adults sen329

Miller, 567 U.S. at 474, 477–78, 489.
Miller, Power to Discriminate, supra note 25, at 863.
331
Constructive life without parole, also known as “de facto life without parole” or “virtual life” refers to sentences that exceed the expected life span of a
defendant. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT 3
(2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/youth-sentenced-lifeimprisonment/ [https://perma.cc/593N-XJAA].
330
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tenced to life without parole.332 While the Court has yet to
recognize special status for these sentences, special status was
not requisite for Furman’s invalidation of the death penalty. On
the contrary, “death is different” was a response to Furman.
Given life without parole’s severity and permanency, one is left
to wonder if arbitrary outcomes might have constitutional
significance.

332
See Carter, López, & Songster, supra note 236, at 348 (indicating life without parole sentences often stem from geography in that “the vast majority of
people serving LWOP sentences are concentrated in a few states”); Brandon L.
Garrett, Travis M. Seale-Carlisle, Karima Modjadidi, & Kristen M. Renberg, Life
Without Parole Sentencing in North Carolina, 99 N.C. L. REV. 279, 285 (2021)
(finding race-of-victim effects and geographic disparities in study of 1,627 people
serving life without parole in North Carolina).
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